



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**UNITED STATES-NIGERIA RELATIONS: IMPACT ON  
NIGERIA'S SECURITY**

by

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December 2014

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**UNITED STATES-NIGERIA RELATIONS: IMPACT ON NIGERIA'S  
SECURITY**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis examines how U.S.-Nigerian relations can be optimized to reduce the growing insecurity in Nigeria and reestablish Nigeria in the strategic calculus of ensuring Africa's regional stability. It analyzes why U.S. security programs are not achieving their desired outcomes despite increased U.S. assistance. It also assesses the 2012 U.S. Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa and U.S. security programs with respect to Nigeria's security challenges. The thesis reveals that poor outcomes are not due to program-problem mismatch, but due to the U.S. bureaucratic bottlenecks in Washington and the incapacity of the Nigerian security agencies. The underlying causes of insecurity in Nigeria, such as low literacy rates, poverty, and weak institutions, also impinge on the program. The remedies lie in repositioning Nigeria's security agencies and building Nigeria's institutions to address the underlying causes of insecurity. The U.S. government also needs to prioritize its humanitarian programs to address more specific problems.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>OVERVIEW OF U.S.-NIGERIAN RELATIONS: LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>JUST OUT OF REACH: UNMET POLICY GOALS .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>LITERATURE REVIEW .....</b>	<b>10</b>
	1. Programs-Problems Mismatch .....	10
	2. U.S. Bureaucratic Bottlenecks .....	11
	3. Incapacity of Nigeria’s Security Agencies .....	13
	4. Addressing Symptoms and Root Causes .....	14
	<i>a. Symptoms.....</i>	<i>14</i>
	<i>b. Root Causes.....</i>	<i>15</i>
<b>E.</b>	<b>METHODS AND SOURCES .....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>F.</b>	<b>THESIS OVERVIEW .....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>II.</b>	<b>ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA’S SECURITY CHALLENGES AND THEIR UNDERLYING CAUSES .....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>NIGERIA’S SECURITY CHALLENGES.....</b>	<b>19</b>
	1. Terrorism.....	19
	2. Ethno-Religious Violence and Communal Crises .....	24
	3. Militancy and Oil Theft in the Niger Delta.....	27
	4. Piracy .....	28
	5. Health and Infectious Disease Threats.....	31
<b>B.</b>	<b>UNDERLYING CAUSES OF INSECURITY IN NIGERIA.....</b>	<b>34</b>
	1. Weak Government Institutions .....	35
	2. Illiteracy .....	35
	3. Poverty and Unemployment.....	38
	4. Porous Borders.....	40
<b>C.</b>	<b>CHAPTER CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>III.</b>	<b>ASSESSMENT OF U.S. SECURITY INITIATIVES IN NIGERIA.....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA .....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>HARD-POWER PROGRAMS .....</b>	<b>44</b>
	1. USAFRICOM.....	44
	<i>a. Security Cooperation Programs .....</i>	<i>46</i>
	<i>b. Exercises.....</i>	<i>46</i>
	<i>c. Operations .....</i>	<i>47</i>
	2. Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) .....	47
	3. Counterterrorism Programs and Training .....	49
	4. Maritime Security Programs .....	54
	5. Excess Defense Articles Transfer .....	55
<b>C.</b>	<b>SOFT-POWER PROGRAMS .....</b>	<b>57</b>
	1. Security Sector Reform .....	57

2.	DOD HIV Program.....	61
3.	Humanitarian Assistance Programs .....	64
4.	Education and Training Programs.....	65
D.	CHAPTER CONCLUSION.....	67
IV.	GAPS IN U.S. SECURITY INITIATIVES IN NIGERIA: ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED .....	71
A.	PROBLEMS BLOCKING PROGRESS OF U.S. SECURITY INITIATIVES .....	71
1.	Problem One: Program Mismatch .....	71
a.	<i>U.S. Security Interests versus African Security Problems ....</i>	72
b.	<i>Misperception or Misdiagnosis?.....</i>	75
c.	<i>Regional versus Country Programming.....</i>	76
d.	<i>Lack of a Multinational Approach to Combat Boko Haram Terrorism .....</i>	77
e.	<i>Disconnect between Training and Implementation.....</i>	78
2.	Problem Two: U.S. Bureaucratic Bottlenecks.....	79
3.	Inconsistent Funding .....	80
4.	Human Rights Issues versus the Severity of the Problem.....	80
5.	Problem Three: Incapacity of the Nigerian Security Agencies .....	81
a.	<i>Weak CT Capability and Technical Intelligence Architecture.....</i>	82
b.	<i>Operational State of the Nigerian Armed Forces.....</i>	83
B.	ADDRESSING THE SYMPTOMS: STATE SECURITY PARADIGM .....	87
1.	Establish a Central Coordinating Agency: Center of Excellence..	87
2.	Upgrade and Integrate Technical Intelligence and Surveillance Capability with a Limited Drone Fleet .....	88
3.	Establish a Multinational Task Force against Nigeria’s Transnational Terrorists.....	89
4.	Develop a Comprehensive Counterinsurgency Strategy for Nigeria.....	89
C.	ADDRESSING THE UNDERLYING CAUSES: HUMANITARIAN SECURITY PARADIGM .....	90
1.	Education Sector Reforms .....	90
2.	Justice Sector Reforms .....	92
3.	Poverty Eradication Programs .....	93
4.	Prioritizing U.S. Humanitarian Assistance .....	93
D.	CHAPTER CONCLUSION.....	95
V.	THESIS CONCLUSION .....	97
	LIST OF REFERENCES .....	99
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	113

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Sub-Saharan Africa Security Enhancement Model. ....	14
Figure 2.	Boko Haram’s Target Types 2009–2013. ....	23
Figure 3.	Map of Nigeria Showing the Sharia-Compliant States. ....	26
Figure 4.	Seven Countries with the Highest Number of Pirate Attacks in 2013. ....	29
Figure 5.	Illiterate Population in Nigeria. ....	36
Figure 6.	Literacy Rate in Nigeria. ....	37
Figure 7.	Unemployed Population in Nigeria. ....	39
Figure 8.	Unemployed Population in Nigeria. ....	40
Figure 9.	TSCTP Activities versus the Agencies. ....	50
Figure 10.	TSCTP Obligated Funds Allocated to Countries and Regions, 2009–2013. ....	51
Figure 11.	Distribution of Funds for USAID and DOS TSCTP Activities, 2005–2007. ....	52
Figure 12.	PEPFAR Centers of Excellence for HIV Testing. ....	62
Figure 13.	Patient Metrics 2006–2009. ....	63
Figure 14.	Selected Terrorist Incidents in Northwest Africa, 2009–2014. ....	74
Figure 15.	Country Comparison between Nigeria and South Africa. ....	85
Figure 16.	Nigerian Armed Forces Inventory. ....	86

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## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Location of Actual and Attempted Attacks, 2009–2013. ....	30
Table 2.	Diseases and the Reported Cases of Deaths in Nigeria, 2007–2011. ....	31
Table 3.	EVD Statistics by Country March–September 2014. ....	33
Table 4.	Peacekeepers and Peacekeeper Trainers Trained, 2005–2009. ....	49
Table 5.	EDA Transfer to Nigeria. ....	56
Table 6.	Scale of Potential for Security Sector Reform. ....	59
Table 7.	Non-lethal Property Transfer in 2012. ....	65
Table 8.	U.S. Foreign Military Training in Nigeria, 2011–2012. ....	67
Table 9.	Comparison of Military Personnel and Defense Expenditure. ....	84

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

ACOTA	Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AFN	Armed Forces of Nigeria
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AMLEP	African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership
APS	African Partnership Station
ATA	Antiterrorism Assistance
CDC.	Center for Disease Control
CJTf-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CT	counterterrorism
CTFP	Counterterrorism Fellowship Program
CVE	counter violence extremism
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOS	U.S. Department of State
EDA	excess defense articles
EVD	Ebola virus disease
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organization
GAO	U.S. Government Accountability Office
GOG	Gulf of Guinea
GPOI	Global Peace Operation Initiative
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IED	improvised explosive devices
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMET	International Military Education and Training
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
OEF-TS	Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara
PEPFAR	U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
RMAC	Regional Maritime Awareness Capability

SSA	sub-Saharan Africa
SSR	security sector reform
TSCTP	Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
U.S.	United States
U.S. AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Christopher Cruz et al. contend that “Nigeria is critical to ensure U.S. prosperity and security for two key reasons: economic interests and regional influence. Nigeria’s massive population, growing economy, and wealth of natural resources provide a vast opportunity for expanded cooperation.”<sup>1</sup> Nigeria is also one of the recipients of the highest amount of U.S. aid in Africa,<sup>2</sup> totaling nearly \$600 million annually since 2011. More broadly, Nigeria is a major oil supplier to the United States, providing 53 percent of U.S. oil imports from Africa—which translates to about 8 percent of all U.S. oil imports globally.<sup>3</sup> As of 2011, U.S. imports from Nigeria under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) total about \$31 billion, and the balance of trade for 2014 is estimated at \$52.9 million.<sup>4</sup> This thesis explores options for improving U.S.-Nigerian relations and bolstering Nigeria’s capacity to pursue its national and regional security imperatives, including peace, stability, and prosperity within a democratizing framework.

Nigeria faces myriad security crises, including militancy, terrorism, piracy and sea robbery, kidnapping, and drug trafficking. Boko Haram<sup>5</sup> terrorists have not only overwhelmed Nigeria’s security apparatus, but have openly threatened the United States. The abduction in April 2014 of some 276 schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno State, Nigeria,

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<sup>1</sup> Christopher A. Cruz, Aaron A. Bazin, and Charles E. Hewins, “Ensuring U.S. Prosperity and Security: The Case for Nigeria,” *Small Wars* (August 18, 2013). <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ensuring-us-prosperity-and-security-the-case-for-nigeria>.

<sup>2</sup> Lauren Ploch, *Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy* (CRS Report No. RL33964) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 20. <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33964.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> Vivian C. Jones, *U.S. Trade and Investment Relations with SSA and the African Growth and Opportunity Act* (CRS Report No. RL31772) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 8. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128835.pdf>. Oil is not the only commodity of interest. According to the government of Nigeria, “Cocoa, bauxite and aluminum, tobacco and waxes, rubber, and grains constituted about \$73 million of U.S. imports from Nigeria in 2010.” Federal Republic of Nigeria, “Nigeria Natural Resources,” (2014). <http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-05-46/2012-11-05-09-52-15>.

<sup>4</sup> United States Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods with Nigeria,” U.S. Department of Commerce, <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c7530.html>; USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Standard Country Report Nigeria” (September, 30, 2012), [http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do?\\_program=/eads/gbk/countryReport&submit=submit&output=2&unit=R&cocode=6NGA](http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do?_program=/eads/gbk/countryReport&submit=submit&output=2&unit=R&cocode=6NGA).

<sup>5</sup> Boko Haram is a terrorist group located in northeastern Nigeria, but it is responsible for violent killings across the country. Its goal is to establish Islamic law in northern Nigeria. Chapter II discusses Boko Haram in more detail.

has provoked international condemnation.<sup>6</sup> Such outrages not only threaten the stability of Nigeria, but also its ability to function as an anchor state in West Africa—and, thus, also affect the interests of the United States.<sup>7</sup>

The United States has taken steps to help Nigeria address these security problems. The U.S. worldwide threat assessment of January 2014 holds that Nigeria's security forces are more reactive than proactive; Nigeria lacks the capability to combat its numerous security challenges.<sup>8</sup> For example, U.S. Marines were deployed in the first week of May 2014 to advise Nigeria on intelligence and training.<sup>9</sup> Such intensive U.S.-Nigerian engagement is unusual;<sup>10</sup> typical exchanges include training assistance and capacity-building programs under the auspices of Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and AFRICOM. ACOTA's main purpose is to build the capacity of partner countries in humanitarian and peace-support operations.<sup>11</sup> AFRICOM's programs include the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and maritime programs and exercises such as the African Partnership Station (APS). Nigeria has participated in APS exercises such as Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS, aimed at building capabilities in counter-piracy and maritime-law enforcement. Nigeria has also benefited from the U.S. maritime-domain awareness system—a regional maritime-awareness capability system installed to enable Nigeria to monitor its maritime domain in the Gulf of Guinea against piracy and other transnational maritime crimes.

The overarching question at issue in the present research is: why are increased U.S. security initiatives and programs not translating to improved security and stability in Nigeria? Specifically, what are the drivers of Nigeria's insecurity, and how do they

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<sup>6</sup> Amy Klobuchar, "U.S. Needs to Help Effort to Bring Back Kidnapped Girls," *CNN World*, May 9, 2014, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/09/opinion/klobuchar-nigerian-girls/>.

<sup>7</sup> James R. Clapper, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* (Washington, DC: ODNI, 2014), 20.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Nigeria, "Boko Haram and U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance to Nigeria," May 14, 2014, [http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/factsheet\\_05142014.html](http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/factsheet_05142014.html).

<sup>10</sup> Donald Rothchild, "The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa," *SAIS Review* 21 (2001): 179.

<sup>11</sup> Stuttgart U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, Germany, "Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)," in *Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)* (2008), 5.

hinder U.S. security initiatives? Finally, what gaps or challenges in U.S.-Nigerian relations must be addressed to allow progress?

**A. OVERVIEW OF U.S.-NIGERIAN RELATIONS: LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD**

Despite the huge trade between the countries and a common interest in African stability, U.S.-Nigerian relations have weathered several lows, especially during military regimes that ran counter to the core principles of American foreign policy. One consequence of the last military regime, under General Sani Abacha in the 1990s, was the cancellation of all U.S. military assistance and training. The return to democracy on May 29, 1999, brought a renewed partnership as the ban on aid to the Nigerian military and other security agencies was lifted.<sup>12</sup> Since then, the prosecution of the global war on terrorism (GWOT) after 9/11 has opened additional channels for security partnerships within the African continent, especially with such anchor states as Nigeria and South Africa. One of the products of this partnership was the establishment of AFRICOM.

The United States formerly encouraged African leaders to maintain friendly relations with Europe, especially former colonial masters, rather than seek close, direct bonds with the United States.<sup>13</sup> Declassified historical documents and memoranda from the U.S. Department of State (DOS) reveal that Washington was somewhat standoffish with Lagos before Nigeria's independence on October 1, 1960. For instance, the U.S. vice consul at Lagos on June 18, 1952, notes that while the United States does not endorse Great Britain's overseas policy, open U.S. support to Nigeria would not only offend the British officials, but could jeopardize the operation of the U.S. consulate general in Nigeria.<sup>14</sup> Nigeria was not comfortable with the United States because of the

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<sup>12</sup> Femi Omotosho, "Governance Crisis and Democracy in Nigeria, 1999–2012," *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 4, no. 14 (2013): 126. Nigeria has experienced a mix of civilian and military regimes with more military governments since its independence in 1960. Although the 2014 Freedom House report categorizes Nigeria as a partly free democracy with a score of 4 out of 7, Nigeria's democratization has proceeded consistently since 1999.

<sup>13</sup> Rothchild, "The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa," 180.

<sup>14</sup> Robert W Ross, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954," accessed July 10, 2014, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d111>.

latter's strong ties to the British colonial government.<sup>15</sup> This dilemma was the hallmark of the U.S.-Nigerian relations during President Harry Truman's administration.

On Nigeria's attainment of independence, U.S.-Nigerian relations became more open and to a large extent detached from the influence of the British officials in Lagos. The U.S. Secretary of State announced U.S. recognition of Nigeria in a Voice of America radio broadcast, while President Eisenhower wrote a formal letter of recognition to the Nigerian Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa on October 2, 1960. Furthermore, the Nigerian embassy was officially opened in Washington, DC, and the U.S. embassy in Lagos was fully established on October 1, 1960. Prime Minister Balewa also paid an official visit to the United States, July 26–28, 1961, where he addressed a special session of the House of Representatives.<sup>16</sup> Consequently, U.S.-Nigerian relations took a great leap forward, especially in the context of anti-colonialism and the political emancipation of African countries. Nigeria became a critical partner in American efforts to curtail Soviet activities in newly independent African states; both countries shared a political interest in ending South African apartheid as well.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, Nigeria expressed its willingness to play a leadership role in Africa and requested U.S. support.<sup>18</sup>

Soviet support to Patrice Lumumba's government confirmed the U.S. suspicion of a communist takeover of Congo. Thus, the United States supported Colonel Mobutu, who staged a coup d'état on September 14, 1960, and expelled the Soviets from Congo. Mobutu also orchestrated the arrest and the subsequent assassination of Lumumba on January 17, 1960.<sup>19</sup> Nigeria provided peacekeeping contingents in Congo, while the United States signed a bilateral military agreement with Congo. Furthermore, the United States supported the Congolese National Army's successful operations in the diamond-

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> J. F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, "America Welcomes Prime Minister Abubakar Balewa of Nigeria, July 1961: 25–28," accessed November 14, 2014, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/USG-01-H.aspx>

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Office of the Historian, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Africa, Document 357," U.S. Department of State, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/ch9>.

<sup>19</sup> "The Congo, Decolonization, and the Cold War, 1960–1965," U.S. Department of State (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2014).

rich Katanga.<sup>20</sup> Nigeria expressed full support to President Johnson's policies, and both Nigeria and the United States expressed great concern about the failure of the United Nations' (UN) forces in Congo in 1964.<sup>21</sup> Nigeria and the United States were also united against Soviet and Chinese influence, Portuguese support to the opposition, and France's ineptitude in the Congo crisis.<sup>22</sup>

This amity and the policy that grew out of it began to shift in 1967, when the Nigerian Civil War began. The period also marked the end of President Johnson's administration and the beginning of President Nixon's administration in 1968, which heralded a growing rift between the American president and his State Department. The United States was sympathetic to Biafra<sup>23</sup> and U.S. officials admired its leader Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu. For example, the U.S. ambassador to Nigeria at the time, Elbert G Mathews writes, "We like romantic leaders, and Ojukwu has panache, quick intelligence, and an actor's voice and fluency."<sup>24</sup> The United States rhetorically maintained a neutral stand in the conflict but undertook to provide aid and arms to the Biafrans through private vendors and the Red Cross.<sup>25</sup> The major low points were the United States' refusal to sell 106mm ammunition to Nigeria for the same rifles procured from the United States, and the U.S. government's disregard of Nigeria's request to terminate aid to Biafra.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, the U.S. press supported Biafra, and the U.S. government made a public pronouncement against the Soviet supply of arms to Nigeria.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Alexis Arieff, *Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Policy* (CRS Report No. R43166) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 4–5; Moses E.U. Tedheke, "Theoretical and Doctrinal Foundations of Nigeria's Peace Support Operations – a Critique," *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 6, no. 1 (2012).

<sup>21</sup> Office of Historian, "Africa Document 357."

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Department of State, "The Congo, Decolonization, and the Cold War, 1960–1965."

<sup>23</sup> Biafra was the name given to southern eastern Nigeria before the declaration of its secession from Nigeria in 1967, which led to the Nigeria Civil War. The main cause of the conflict is the ethnic dichotomy and power sharing problems in the central government.

<sup>24</sup> Egbert G Mathews, "Foreign Relations of the United States, Africa, Document 395," U.S. State Department: Office of the Historian, accessed June 16, 2014, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d395>.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

Consequently, the Nigerian government and most Nigerians saw U.S. actions as a breach of trust and confidence.

Suspicion and misunderstanding characterized the Ford administration's relationship with Nigeria after the civil war, a legacy of the fractious years leading up to this period in both countries. Nigeria perceived the United States as indifferent toward its plight and decided to meet any U.S. initiatives and gestures with dismissive skepticism.<sup>28</sup> The United States, on the other hand, sought to avoid disaffecting Nigeria further.<sup>29</sup> Hence, the relations were focused on confidence-building measures especially from the standpoint of the United States anti-communist Cold War policy in Africa.

The repressive General Sani Abacha administration in the 1990s marked another low in U.S.-Nigerian relations. The United States was already upset with General Babangida's annulment of the 1993 presidential elections, which returned Moshood Abiola as the president-elect. General Abacha's ousting of the interim government in November 1993 not only denied Nigeria a first democratic transition after a long period of military rule but also further damaged U.S.-Nigerian relations. The regime clamped down and jailed many pro-democracy activists, including the president-elect. Furthermore, the trial and execution of a world-renowned writer, Ken Saro Wiwa, and eight others appalled the world.<sup>30</sup>

Since Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999, relations between the two nations have improved over the years through President Obasanjo's, Yar A' Dua, and now Jonathan's administrations.<sup>31</sup> According to John Campbell, a former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, "The positive relations are largely based on our parallel interests since the end of the civil war: African regional stability through conflict prevention or resolution and

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<sup>28</sup> Office of the Historian, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973–1976, Africa, Document 200," U.S. Department of State, accessed July 18, 2014, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve06/d200>.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Cece Modupe Fadope, "Nigeria," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, January 1, 1997, <http://fpif.org/nigeria/>.

<sup>31</sup> Smart Uhakheme, *Nigeria- U.S. Relations: Perspective on Political Change in Africa* (Maryland: UPA, 2008), 12; John Campbell, *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink* (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 143.

addressing public health challenges, especially HIV/AIDS and malaria.”<sup>32</sup> Since the inception of the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) program in 2004, Nigeria has received more than \$3.4 billion to combat the AIDS epidemic.<sup>33</sup> Among other efforts, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) commissioned HIV testing and counseling centers at the 44 Nigerian Army Reference Hospitals in 2007, and the Defense Reference Laboratory, Mogadishu Barracks, Abuja, in 2012.<sup>34</sup>

Security cooperation has also been on the increase. Between 2003 and 2014, the United States transferred six decommissioned Coast Guard vessels to Nigeria under the U.S. Excess Defense Articles program. The last was the cutter *Gallatin*, transferred to the Nigerian Navy in May 2014.<sup>35</sup> Despite such exchanges, total U.S. military assistance to Nigeria was reduced from \$11.1 million in 2011 to \$4.9 in 2012.<sup>36</sup> Still, Nigeria tries to lead the West African sub-region in security and stability, though its own internal-security problems may contradict or undermine this role. In the 1990s, for example, Nigeria played a leading role in regional peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria also intervened and restored democracy in Sao Tome and Principe after the coup d’état of July 16, 2003.<sup>37</sup>

## **B. JUST OUT OF REACH: UNMET POLICY GOALS**

For all of this involvement and these shared goals, U.S.-Nigerian cooperation has not yielded the outcomes desired, especially in terms of Nigeria’s role in maintaining

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<sup>32</sup> Campbell, *Nigeria*, 143.

<sup>33</sup> United States Diplomatic Mission to Nigeria, “U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief,” accessed July 18, 2014, <http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/pepfar.html>.

<sup>34</sup> U.S. Military HIV Research Program, “New Defense Reference Laboratory Commissioned in Nigeria,” accessed August 2, 2014, <http://www.hivresearch.org/news.php?NewsID=249>; “U.S. DOD HIV Program – Nigeria Collaborates on New HIV/AIDS Center in Kaduna,” DOD, accessed August 3, 2014, <https://www01.hjf.org/apps/internet/hivnewscenter.nsf/newsmainlistview/5F1725FEA858EF8F852572EB0050020A>.

<sup>35</sup> Linda M. Johnson, “U.S. Coast Guard Transfers High Endurance Cutters Hamilton and Chase to the Philippines and Nigeria,” USCG Acquisition Directorate, <http://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/newsroom/pdf/CG9newsletterMay11.pdf>.

<sup>36</sup> USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Standard Country Report Nigeria.”

<sup>37</sup> Joao Gomes Porto, “Coups D’état in São Tomé and Príncipe,” *African Security Review* 12, no. 4 (2003): 34.

effective regional influence. Nigeria's current security challenges have frustrated its ability to fulfill foreign-policy imperatives, as when Nigeria withdrew from a peacekeeping mission in Mali in July 2013 to shore up counterterrorism efforts against Boko Haram in the northeast.<sup>38</sup> The April 14, 2014, Abuja bombing, coinciding with the abduction of 276 schoolgirls in Borno State, casts doubt on Nigeria's ability to counter terrorism on its own.<sup>39</sup> Similarly, piracy and oil theft are severely damaging Nigeria's economy and international maritime trade. In the Gulf of Guinea, pirate attacks increased from 39 in 2010 to 64 in 2013. Compounding Nigeria's economic losses, about \$4 million in crude oil is stolen daily.<sup>40</sup>

The mounting complexity of Nigeria's situation has moved the United States to pursue new channels of cooperation. For example, the U.S.-Nigerian Bi-National Commission, launched in April 2014, focuses on four key areas: good governance, security cooperation, energy reform, and food-security/agricultural development.<sup>41</sup> In 2011, then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted, "We will stand with Nigeria as it faces serious security issues. The bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja last month was a horrific and cowardly act, and we want to work with Nigeria and West Africa to improve security and to make sure that we also address the legitimate needs of people before extremists have a chance to exploit them."<sup>42</sup> Despite this pledge in 2011, the situation has worsened; clearly, U.S. policies are not achieving their intended outcomes.

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<sup>38</sup> Information Nigeria, "Mali: Nigerian Troops Withdrawal Begins Today," Information Nigeria, July 2013, <http://www.informationng.com/2013/07/mali-nigerian-troops-withdrawal-begins-today-2.html>. Boko Haram is one of the world's deadliest terrorist groups, with a record of 801 attacks and 3,666 fatalities from 2009–2013. Global Terrorism Database, "Terrorists Incidents in Nigeria," University of Maryland, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=nigeria&sa.x=55&sa.y=10&sa=Search>. They operate along Nigeria's northeastern border, beside the Niger Republic, Chad, and Cameroon, a mostly ungoverned region that provides easy sanctuary.

<sup>39</sup> IHS, "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Nigeria Security," accessed July 4, 2014, <https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?ItemId=1302710>.

<sup>40</sup> Barbara Starr and Catherine E. Shoichet, "2 Seized in Pirate Attack off Nigeria, U.S. Official Says," CNN, October 24, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/24/world/africa/nigeria-vessel-attack/index.html>; Talatu Usman, "Nigeria Loses N640 Million Daily to Crude Oil Theft - Official," *Premium Times*, January 3, 2014, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201401031051.html>.

<sup>41</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Signing Ceremony for the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission," accessed July 30, 2014, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/04/139571.htm>.

<sup>42</sup> U.S. State Department, "Remarks with Nigerian Foreign Minister Olugbenga Ashiru after Their Meeting," September 29, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/09/174818.htm>.

Three reasons for this failure emerge. First, existing programs do not necessarily fit the target problems. The symptoms of dysfunction and disorder are typically addressed, not root causes, and problems may be misdiagnosed or badly generalized by U.S. agencies, as typically when the American perception of security needs differs markedly from the reality experienced by Africans. For instance, the United States wanted to provide two sophisticated video cameras to the Mauritanian security agencies at \$10,000 each, but dialogue with the Mauritians led to the procurement of different cameras, which are easy to use and maintained at about \$1,100 each.<sup>43</sup> Additionally, the drivers of insecurity, such as weak government institutions, poverty, material inequality, and ethnic rivalry in Nigeria, may hamper program effectiveness.<sup>44</sup> For example, poverty and weak law enforcement enhances Islamic radicalization despite counterterrorism efforts.

Second, even when a program fits the problem, a lack of necessary equipment and platforms among Nigerian security agencies may render the program ineffective. Among the capability gaps commonly found are a lack of a robust intelligence infrastructure and inadequate land, air, and surface platforms.<sup>45</sup> Finally, the conflicting roles and missions of U.S. agencies administering aid and U.S. bureaucrats enforcing inflexible policies such as “no boots on ground” can have detrimental effects—for example, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts in Northwest Africa Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management* (Washington, DC: GAO, 2014), 27.

<sup>44</sup> I.C. Achumba, O. S. Ighomereho, and M. O. M. Akpor-Oboro, “Security Challenges in Nigeria and the Implications for Business Activities and Sustainable Development,” *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development* 4, no. 2 (2013): 81–82.

<sup>45</sup> Andre Le Sage, “Africa’s Irregular Security Threats: Challenges for U.S. Engagement,” *Strategic Forum* no. 255 (2010): 8–9.

<sup>46</sup> Rory Carroll, “U.S. Choose to Ignore Rwandan Genocide,” *theguardian.com*, March 31, 2004, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/31/usa.rwanda>

## C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on U.S.-Africa relations has enjoyed significant augmentation within the last three decades.<sup>47</sup> Most scholars have focused on general areas of common interest, such as economy, politics, and security. What has not been explored is the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy initiatives in curbing Nigeria's security problems, particularly terrorism, piracy, and oil theft. This review focuses on discussion of why some programs do not fit target problems, the inability of Nigerian security agencies to execute programs that fit, and the effect of U.S. bureaucratic inflexibility on program effectiveness. It also discusses how to address root causes and symptoms.

### 1. Programs-Problems Mismatch

Many scholars have argued that U.S. policy in Africa has a one-size-fits-all approach that does not substantially help Africa's security problems. For example, Princeton Lyman argues that the United States focuses more on humanitarian and moral concerns than on security, and contends that though humanitarian assistance is important, it does not effectively support the multifaceted U.S. interests in the continent. He emphasizes a need to balance human-security and state-security programs to achieve the desired objectives.<sup>48</sup>

Others point to the fact that U.S. approaches emphasize irrelevant aspects of security challenges. Carl LeVan criticizes the DOD's environmental programs as a faulty diagnosis of Africa's security problems—for example, arguing that DOD studies and simulation exercises on the environment should not be a priority in Africa. An example is AFRICOM's seminar on environmental preservation, held in Cape Verde—typical of a program irrelevant to security problems.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Kofi Nsia-Pepa, "Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa: Strategic Gain or Backlash?" *Military Review* (2014).

<sup>48</sup> Princeton N. Lyman, "Strategic Approach to Terrorism," in *Africa-U.S. Relations*, ed. Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2006), 49.

<sup>49</sup> Carl LeVan, "The Political Economy of African Responses to the U.S. Africa Command," *Africa Today* 57, no. 1 (2010): 19.

Others point to an excessive U.S. focus on symptoms, notably terrorism, rather than causes. This misplaced emphasis means that security programs will never stem the challenges; it merely helps countries to manage them. Guy Lamb notes that the practice forces African governments to use their scarce resources for counterterrorism rather than addressing the causes of insecurity, for example, poverty and illiteracy. Not only does such an approach provide only a short-term solution, but in the longer run it may actually make matters worse. Lamb argues that the skills acquired from counterterrorism initiatives could prove counterproductive, especially when used by a repressive government against its people.<sup>50</sup> With these characteristics, U.S. programs may end up subverting their intended outcomes.

Serafino et al. note a trend in the DOD toward performing many DOS roles. They believe that the GWOT and the increasingly overlapping roles of the DOD are undermining the conduct of foreign policy, especially in the soft-power missions of governance, education, and development programs, which should be the purview of the DOS. Again, this shift emphasizes only the symptoms, thereby weakening the effects of programs.<sup>51</sup>

## **2. U.S. Bureaucratic Bottlenecks**

There is much discussion in the literature of U.S. bureaucratic inflexibility. Shraeder focuses on the interplay between incrementalism, crisis, and change in U.S. policy formulation toward Africa. He contends that U.S. foreign policy toward Africa has not been effective because it has been driven by the changing events in Africa. Furthermore, he notes:

The net result of the bureaucratic influence within the policymaking process is that the Africa policies of the United States become fragmented, interpreted differently, according to the established organizational

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<sup>50</sup> Guy Lamb, "Parading U.S. Security Interests as African Security Policy," *Contemporary Security Policy* 30, no. 1 (2009): 51.

<sup>51</sup> Nina M. Serafino, Catherine Dale, and Pat Towell, *Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad* (CRS Report No. R42133) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 19.

missions of each bureaucracy that historically has been created to deal with a particular aspect of foreign policy relations.<sup>52</sup>

His sentiments echo the shift in Africa policy from active during the Cold War, low-profile after the Cold War, and active again, though on a somewhat different footing, after 9/11 for the GWOT. Notably, even the Bureau for African Affairs established by DOS in 1958, was not as effective as other regional entities, for example, the Bureau for European and Canadian Affairs.<sup>53</sup> Issues between Africa and Europe were mostly addressed in the European Bureau.<sup>54</sup>

Donald Rothchild and Nicholas Emmanuel examine the effect of U.S. domestic politics on its engagements in Africa. They observe that with the exception of South Africa, Angola, Somalia, and Sudan, the United States faces a dilemma of when to intervene in internal problems. Their analysis further shows that American domestic politics favors non-military engagements over military programs, and the GWOT has further legitimized DOD “non-kinetic missions,” which conflict with the mission of the DOS and damage the effectiveness of U.S. security initiatives.<sup>55</sup>

The problem of interagency coordination also determines outcomes in U.S. security initiatives. For example, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) documents reveal that AFRICOM has no overarching strategy or coordination to its multifaceted responsibilities in Africa. Even where a plan is developed, the overlapping roles of various agencies tend to thwart positive outcomes, and bottlenecks thwart success.<sup>56</sup> For example, conflicts between DOD and DOS on which should report to

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<sup>52</sup> Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 16.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Nikolas Emmanuel and Donald Rothchild, “Intervention in Africa’s Ethnic Conflicts: The Scope for Action,” in *U.S.-Africa Relations* (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2006), 73.

<sup>56</sup> John H. Pendleton, *Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges at DOD’s Southern and Africa Commands* (GAO-10-962T ) (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010), 4–12, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125154.pdf>

under the TSCTP program affects smooth execution of projects.<sup>57</sup> Additionally, disagreement between DOS and DOD on the number of DOD personnel to be allowed in a country led to the suspension of a DOD program.<sup>58</sup> The poor outcomes in the U.S. humanitarian assistance at the initial stage of the 2010 Haiti earthquake were blamed on poor logistics coordination between agencies.<sup>59</sup>

### **3. Incapacity of Nigeria's Security Agencies**

An important factor in the effectiveness of any program is the ability to institutionalize or execute the program within and by indigenous organizations. Most African security agencies have inadequate equipment or lack the capacity to execute programs after training. As Ambassador Jonnie Carson observes:

All the countries in the Sahel face daunting challenges. They are among the poorest countries in the world and lack the resources to develop effective antiterrorism programs on their own. They are also vast countries, stretching over thousands of miles, where government services and authority are weak or nonexistent. They are preoccupied with critical humanitarian and development issues, and, in some cases, terrorism is not their most pressing challenge.<sup>60</sup>

Although Nigeria is economically better off than most Sahel countries, it faces the same problem of weak governmental services. For instance, the serviceability of equipment in the Nigerian armed forces is very low.<sup>61</sup> How can such equipment be effectively deployed against terrorism or piracy after the U.S. capacity-building program is over?

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<sup>57</sup> John H. Pendleton, , *Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership*( GAO-08-860)(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008), 4, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/279056.pdf>

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Pendleton, *Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges*, 13.

<sup>60</sup> Subcommittee on African Affairs, *Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy across Africa's Sahel Region*, November 17, 2009, 3, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2009/132082.htm>

<sup>61</sup> Jane's IHS, "Nigerian Armed Forces: Security Assessment," <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html>.

#### 4. Addressing Symptoms and Root Causes

Donald Rothchild distinguishes between state-strategic and human-security paradigms in U.S. foreign policy on Africa and captures the gamut of the two approaches in the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) enhancement model depicted in Figure 1.<sup>62</sup> The horizontal axis shows the function a specific program is designed to affect, while the vertical corresponds to either humanitarian or state-strategic security.




Figure 1. Sub-Saharan Africa Security Enhancement Model.<sup>63</sup>

##### a. Symptoms

The state-strategic paradigm is rooted in the realist tradition, which requires states to maximize power to protect themselves. It establishes a nexus between U.S. and African security, in the sense that weak states might be a breeding ground for terrorists, as seen in Afghanistan. Indeed, Africa has many weak and ungoverned states,<sup>64</sup> which

<sup>62</sup> Donald Rothchild, "Africa-U.S. Relations: Strategic Encounters," in *Trends in U.S.-Africa Relations: Implications for the Future*, ed. Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 248.

<sup>63</sup> Gregory Joachim, "Draining the Swamps or Feeding the Crocodiles in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Orbis* 49, no. 1 (2005): 169.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

results in lawless activity such as that of Somali pirates in the Horn of Africa, necessitating an international response.

Andre Le Sage stresses: “Engaging African states as reliable partners to confront irregular security challenges will be a complex process requiring a three-pronged strategy.”<sup>65</sup> The first phase entails capacity building in various contingencies for security and law enforcement, including media. The second phase requires deployment of U.S. personnel in Africa to consolidate the capacities created in phase one, to the level that Africans can execute operations on their own. The third phase involves the political will of African leadership to deploy their better-prepared security forces while ensuring that inculcated best practices and respect for human rights are observed.<sup>66</sup> Le Sage calls for a comprehensive strategy for engaging with Nigeria, rather than a reactive approach. The strategy must include a persistent and coherent U.S. presence until Nigerians can fully assume responsibilities.

John Campbell stresses, “Modest U.S. military overtures in 2009–2010 to provide training for the Nigerian Military were a step in the right direction.”<sup>67</sup> In the same vein, the U.S. deployment of marines to advise in the rescue of the 300 girls abducted on April 15 reinforces the perception that the United States is committed to partnering with Nigeria as an anchor state. This level of assistance reveals that Nigerian security agencies still require capacity building and robust intelligence architecture to combat terrorism.

#### ***b. Root Causes***

The human-security paradigm addresses the root causes of insecurity, which include urgent humanitarian, socioeconomic, and cultural problems.<sup>68</sup> The United States focuses on aid and development programs in Africa in response to this model. Some of

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<sup>65</sup> Le Sage, “Africa’s Irregular Security Threats: Challenges for U.S. Engagement.”

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>67</sup> Campbell, *Nigeria*, 170.

<sup>68</sup> Donald Rothchild, “Trends and Implications for the Future,” in *Africa-U.S. Relations*, ed. Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2006), 252.

these programs include the AGOA, the Million Challenge Cooperation, and PEPFAR.<sup>69</sup> Rothchild notes that human-security issues are less selective than state-strategic security issues, and for Africa, they must go hand-in-hand to be effective.

One prevalent idea is that a focus on military responses is too narrow and tends to develop programs that are bound to fail. Kofi Nsia Pepra writes: “It would be naïve to ignore the relevance of military force in overseas contingency operations, but the United States’ failure to address the root causes of the growing insurgency in Africa is also a strategic miscalculation.”<sup>70</sup> He recommends that the United States work with African states to promote good governance, poverty eradication, and prudent use of resources to arrest declining state capacities. Nsia-Pepra’s thoughts are relevant, but not novel, because they are already enshrined in U.S. foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, some scholars like Nsia-Pepra feel that the GWOT has made the United States turn a blind eye to some root causes of insecurity. There is a need for a comprehensive U.S. strategy that reconciles state-security and humanitarian-security imperatives.

Gregory Joachim’s conclusion regarding security enhancement is that “programs supporting security ... functions must be focused on those that strengthen the bond between the citizens and their governments. Only the reestablishment of the social contract will foster internal security in locations of strategic interests to the United States.”<sup>71</sup> His sentiments are apt. In Nigeria, if U.S. security programs were not in place, the situation would probably be far worse. Nevertheless, tightening the gap between the rich and the poor and delivery of public goods will lead to better outcomes for Nigeria.

The literature features two distinct schools of thought on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign-policy initiatives in Africa. One school believes that root causes should receive priority; the other supports the hard-power approach. Interestingly, however, both schools

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<sup>69</sup> Ted Dagne, *Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues* (CRS Report No. RL33591) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 1; Brock R. Williams, “African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Background and Reauthorization” (2013); and Mwangi S. Kimenyi Robert Chutha, *The Africa Growth and Opportunities Act: Toward 2015 and Beyond – A Synthesis of Stakeholder’s Views on the Future of U.S.-Africa Commercial Relationships* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2011).

<sup>70</sup> Nsia-Pepra, “Militarization,” 57.

<sup>71</sup> Joachim, “Draining the Swamp,” 170.

contend that neither approach can stand on its own, without including some aspects of the other. Problems that came to light were the overlapping roles of U.S. agencies administering aid, which contribute to poor results, and the inadequate equipment, platforms, and operational status of African security agencies.

## **E. METHODS AND SOURCES**

This thesis takes an explanatory approach in ascertaining the priorities of U.S.-Nigerian relations for enhanced security in Nigeria. Various sources are used to carry out this research. Priority is given to primary sources in Nigeria and the United States. On the Nigerian side, senate hearings, government documents, and recorded interviews will be consulted; on the American side, congressional hearings, committee reports, Congressional Research Service reports, Government Accountability Office reports, and official declassified U.S. documents.

Secondary sources, which include books, publications, expert analysis, journals, and media and class debates on U.S. policy on Africa, enrich this research. Efforts will be made to balance the literature between scholars from the West who have written a great deal on Africa and scholars of African origin.

Newspapers and periodicals are of particular interest in the light of the current global outcry on the Boko Haram debacle. CNN, BBC, the Nigerian Network News, and the Nigerian press generally will provide useful insights. Analysis from the Nigerian Institute for international Affairs, United States Agency for International Development, and seminars held at both the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and Monterey Institute of International Studies has been very helpful and will be cited.

## **F. THESIS OVERVIEW**

The thesis that follows contains five chapters. This chapter provides a historical overview of U.S.-Nigerian relations from Nigerian independence to the present day. It also covered the literature review and methodology used.

Chapter II addresses Nigeria's security challenges and the drivers of insecurity in Nigeria. It focuses on terrorism and maritime-security challenges that connect with U.S. security initiatives. This focus facilitates analysis and measurements of effectiveness.

Chapter III deals with U.S. security initiatives in Nigeria from the perspective of the U.S. strategy for SSA, covering security-sector reforms, ACOTA, AFRICOM, and other programs that address state and humanitarian security.

Chapter IV reconciles security challenges and corresponding initiatives to discover the gaps that need to be addressed. It essentially forms a basis for analysis and policy positions on each issue.

Chapter V contains a conclusion and recommendations, synthesizing the research in the previous chapters.

## **II. ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA’S SECURITY CHALLENGES AND THEIR UNDERLYING CAUSES**

Democratization has restored Nigeria as a strategic partner in the comity of nations, particularly in terms of the pivotal role it has played in Africa’s security and stability. The United States has also increased DOD programs to build the capacity of the Nigerian military to combat such threats as terrorism and piracy. Nonetheless, the security challenges seem to increase. Issues like terrorism in northern Nigeria, militancy in the Niger Delta, kidnappings across the country, and piracy in local and regional waters have all risen—and are rising still. This chapter explores the past and present of Nigeria’s security challenges and their underlying causes.

### **A. NIGERIA’S SECURITY CHALLENGES**

Nigeria, on the one hand, is a blessed country in terms of enormous mineral and natural resources; on the other hand, it is tormented with turmoil within and without its borders.<sup>72</sup> Although fractures along ethnic and religious lines have received perhaps the most and the most sustained international attention, there is much more to Nigeria’s security situation—and the underlying causes are complex and sometimes connected. The major threats to Nigeria’s security include terrorism; ethno-religious violence, and communal crises; militancy in the Niger Delta; piracy; and health and infectious diseases.<sup>73</sup>

#### **1. Terrorism**

Terrorism in Nigeria is mainly perpetrated by Boko Haram. The exact origin of Boko Haram is obscure, but its linkage with Nigeria’s fanatical Maitatsine sect of the early 1980s seems to resonate in most literature.<sup>74</sup> Boko Haram translates to English as “Western education is forbidden,” a programmatic motto that well reflects one of the

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<sup>72</sup> Clarence J. Bouchat, *The Causes of Instability in Nigeria and Implications for the United States* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College- Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), 1–5.

<sup>73</sup> IHS, “Nigeria Security”; Ploch, “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” i.

<sup>74</sup> J Peter Pham, “Boko Haram’s Evolving Threat,” no. 20 (2012):1, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/Africa-Security-Brief/ASB-20.pdf>.

group's aims; the group prefers to be identified by the name Jama'atu Alhus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad).<sup>75</sup> The group is religiously motivated and espouses a pan-Islamic or Jihadi ideology. It wants to see the creation of an Islamic regime in northern Nigeria, free from Western influences.<sup>76</sup>

The group started as a movement in 2001 at Ndimi Mosque in Borno State, located in the northeastern part of Nigeria. In a bid to create a community based on Sharia and Islamic principles, the group moved from Maiduguri to the neighboring Kanamma village of Yobe state in 2002. Essentially, Yobe and Maiduguri were big cities in Borno state before Yobe state was founded in 1991. The people of this part of Nigeria are mostly Muslims and share the same culture. The states are also the most impoverished in Nigeria in terms of resources, infrastructure, and unemployment. Additionally, poverty is on the increase while the literacy rate is low.<sup>77</sup> Thus, the group's more immediate grievances are the poor socioeconomic conditions and corruption in northern Nigeria. Thereafter, the group became more radicalized and ideological espousing Jihadi ideology.

Boko Haram came to the attention of the Nigerian media in 2003, when it attacked police stations and government buildings in Yobe because of police intervention in fishing-rights disputes. The group, then referred to as the "Nigerian Taliban," also ultimately attracted the attention of the media and the U.S. embassy in Nigeria. Further confrontation with the police in Yobe led to the death of the group's leader, Mohammed Ali. The remaining members of the group fled back to Maiduguri under the leadership of

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<sup>75</sup> Andrew Walker, "What Is Boko Haram" (Washington ,DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2012), 1–2; Sage, "Africa's Irregular Security Threats: Challenges for U.S. Engagement," 3–4.

<sup>76</sup> Lori Hinnant and Sylvie Corbet, "Summit Combats Boko Haram Funds, Arms, Training," Associated Press, <http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/may/17/african-leaders-work-to-counter-boko-haram/>; Corina Simonelli, "Boko Haram Recent Attacks," [http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport\\_BokoHaramRecentAttacks\\_May2014\\_0.pdf](http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaramRecentAttacks_May2014_0.pdf).

<sup>77</sup> National Bureau for Statistics, "Revised and Final Results by Output Approach," <http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/nbslibrary/economic-statistics/gross-domestic-product>.

Mohammed Yusuf, who began rapidly reorganizing the group and built a private mosque on land belonging to his father-in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed.<sup>78</sup>

Despite its violent record, the group was left to go about its activities in Maiduguri unperturbed. The official latitude might have been attributed to the desire to allow the group freedom to practice its religion in a predominantly Muslim state or to a lack of effective intelligence about the group. Either way, this respite gave Boko Haram the opportunity to propagate its radical beliefs, recruit new members, and operate under Sharia law. It drew members from the impoverished villages of Maiduguri as well as the border communities of the Republics of Chad and Niger. The group's source of funds is unclear. However, it is alleged that some Muslim northern Nigerian politicians and Salafist contacts in Saudi Arabia are the main sources of funding, which is supplemented by robbery, kidnapping, and human trafficking.<sup>79</sup> The argument about the northern Nigerian politicians sponsorship plays into the narrative of supporting the Islamic cause to avoid being blacklisted. Some would also argue that the politicians from the ruling party and the opposition are using the insurgency to make claims and counterclaims for political gains.<sup>80</sup>

Most Nigerian Muslims and scholars have not accepted the group's hardline ideology. For example, in 2007 a highly revered Muslim cleric, Sheik Mahmoud Ja'afar, denounced the sect—and was brutally murdered for it. The assassination of Sheik Ja'afar further alienated Boko Haram from mainstream Muslim support, especially in northwestern Nigeria.

Still, the group continued to escalate its rhetoric and its violence. Boko Haram's major campaign began in 2009, when members on motorcycles shot some traffic policemen enforcing the use of helmets. The event was followed by a series of attacks on

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<sup>78</sup> Walker, "What Is Boko Haram," 3–4.

<sup>79</sup> Simonelli, "Boko Haram," 3; Walker, "What Is Boko Haram," 3–5; Ahmad Murtada, "Boko Haram in Nigeria: Its Beginning, Principles, and Activities," *Islamic and African Studies Journal*, no. 12 (2012): 7–8.

<sup>80</sup> ACLED, "The Nigerian Election and the Politicisation of the Boko Haram Insurgency," <http://www.crisis.acleddata.com/the-nigerian-election-and-the-politicisation-of-the-boko-haram-insurgency/>.

police stations, punctuated by a video that the group disseminated in which Mohammed Yusuf threatened more attacks on police and government buildings.<sup>81</sup>

In response, the government security agencies launched a full-scale operation against Boko Haram in 2009. Ibn Tammiyah mosque was cordoned, several people were killed, and some were executed without trial. The Nigerian Army arrested and handed over Mohammed Yusuf to the police during one of its raids, in 2009. Yusuf died in police custody, but the police claimed he died during a shootout. The surviving members fled, while others blended into the society—akin to Mao Tse-tung’s description of “insurgents moving in society like fish in water.”<sup>82</sup>

The period between late 2009 and 2010 was relatively peaceful, which appeared to mark a victory for Nigerian security agencies. In reality, however, the sect used this period to reorganize and train across the Sahel and North Africa. Now under the leadership of Yusuf’s deputy Abubakar Shekau, the group is said to have trained with other extremist groups, including Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, Al-Shabaab, and the Tuareg rebels in Mali. Shekau organized the group into cells that have committed atrocities across Nigeria in the years since.

The frequency, audacity, ferocity, and indiscriminate nature of Boko Haram’s attacks have cast doubts on Nigeria’s ability to counter terrorism alone. Boko Haram and its cohorts have resorted to kidnapping for ransom and intimidation. For example, in 2013, Ansaru claimed responsibility for raiding a multinational construction company’s site and abducted seven foreign workers.<sup>83</sup> Furthermore, in 2012 Boko Haram kidnapped and killed a German national, Edgar Fritz Raupach, in Kano state. Further, the abduction of 276 schoolgirls on April 15, 2014, has provoked international condemnation and response.<sup>84</sup> For instance, the United States sent more than 80 marines to assist Nigerian security agencies, while France held an emergency summit with Africa leaders in Paris

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<sup>81</sup> Murtada, “Boko Haram,” 8.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ploch, *Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, 13.

<sup>84</sup> IHS, “Nigeria Security.”

on May 17, 2014, to coordinate efforts on combatting Boko Haram.<sup>85</sup> Nigeria has received counterterrorism cooperation from neighboring countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Nevertheless, none of the girls have been found and terrorist incidents have continued.

Statistics from the global terrorism database (Figure 2) indicate that from 2009 to 2013, 9 percent of Boko Haram’s targets were military, while 22 percent were police.




Figure 2. Boko Haram’s Target Types 2009–2013.<sup>86</sup>

Figure 2 also reveals that private citizens are the worst hit, representing 25 percent of the target. Education, which the group most loathes, is among the least affected—7 percent. Such horrific indiscriminate targeting draws some correlation with other pan-Islamic terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda.

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<sup>85</sup> Corbet, “Summit Combats Boko Haram Funds, Arms, Training”; Simonelli, “Boko Haram,” 3.

<sup>86</sup> Simonelli, “Boko Haram,” 3.

Some military and police personnel have been accused of tipping off Boko Haram on impending military operations.<sup>87</sup> It has also been reported local authorities and citizens withhold information for the fear of their family being targeted by Boko Haram.<sup>88</sup> Investigations to ascertain the veracity of these claims have been partly politicized and partly inconclusive.<sup>89</sup> In a recent video, the Boko Harm leadership ridiculed the “bring back our girls” campaign, which suggests that the situation has not significantly changed.<sup>90</sup> Boko Haram has also posted the beheading of a Nigerian Air Force pilot who was missing after ejecting from his aircraft.<sup>91</sup> Consequently, the persistence of Boko Haram has continued to damage the prestige of the Nigerian security sector at national and global level.

## **2. Ethno-Religious Violence and Communal Crises**

Boko Haram represents a particularly dangerous extension of Nigeria’s ethno-religious violence and communal crisis, which continue to present great threats to Nigeria’s security and stability, with huge ramifications in terms of lives and property. Since the early 1980s, Nigeria has witnessed several ethno-religious crises. Some of these crises include: the Maitatsine religious disturbances in Kano,<sup>92</sup> the Zangon Kataf crisis in

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<sup>87</sup>Pamela Dockins, “Army, Boko Haram Working Together in Parts of Nigeria?” Voice of America, April 5, 2014, <http://www.voanews.com/content/army-boko-haram-working-together-in-parts-of-nigeria/1887128.html>.

<sup>88</sup> Tansa Musa, “Living in ‘Total Fear’ of Boko Haram in Cameroon’s North,” Reuters, June 26, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/uk-cameroon-boko-haram-idUSKBN0F130B20140626>.

<sup>89</sup> nsnbc International, “Nigerian Military: No Officers Arrested over Collusion with Boko Haram,” June 4, 2014, <http://nsnbc.me/2014/06/04/nigerian-military-officers-arrested-collusion-boko-haram/>.

<sup>90</sup> Colin Freeman, “Missing Nigerian Schoolgirls: Boko Haram Issues New Video Mocking Bring Back our Girls Campaign,” *Telegraph*, July 13 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/10964606/Missing-Nigerian-schoolgirls-Boko-Haram-issues-new-video-mocking-BringBackOurGirls-campaign.html>.

<sup>91</sup> Stephanie Linning, “Boko Haram Releases Video Showing Beheading of Nigerian Air Force Pilot as Terror Leader Who Was Thought Dead Reappears,” *Daily Mail*, October 3, 2014, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2780169/Boko-Haram-releases-video-showing-beheading-Nigerian-Air-Force-pilot-terror-leader-declares-Even-kill-not-stop-imposing-Islamic-rule.html>.

<sup>92</sup> Maitatsine crisis was the first Islamic cult violence in Nigeria. It occurred in 1984 in Kano and some parts of Maiduguri—the current stronghold of Boko Haram. The group shares the same name of its leader Marwa Maitatsine, who claimed to be a prophet. The group carried out major atrocities and execution of non-members until the decapitation of its leader by the Nigerian Army.

Kaduna State,<sup>93</sup> the Ife-modakeke crisis in Oyo State,<sup>94</sup> and the most current ethno-religious violence in Jos, Plateau State.<sup>95</sup> The Ife-Modakeke crisis was purely ethnic; the other conflicts have religious dimensions to them.<sup>96</sup>

Most of the ethno-religious conflicts have triggered retaliation against religious or ethnic minorities in other parts of Nigeria. For example, the Shagumu crises between the Yorubas and the Hausas provoked the expulsion of Yorubas and the destruction of their property in Kano. As the situation began to ease, the Odua People's Congress, a pan-Yoruba organization, carried out reprisal attacks on Hausa/Fulani traders in the Lagos Mile-12 market. Similarly, the introduction of Sharia law in Zamfara State and its spillover effect in other parts of northern Nigeria led to the destruction of properties belonging to the Igbos in Kaduna State. In the same vein, the Igbos in Enugu State took on the Hausa community by killing people and destroying their property.<sup>97</sup> The map in Figure 3 shows the Sharia-compliant states in Nigeria.

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
<sup>93</sup>The 1992 Zangon Kataf crisis started with the killing of some Muslims in the Zangon Kataf local government area of Kaduna state. It resulted in what Richard English referred to as a vicious cycle of victimhood that polarized a hitherto peaceful city. Since then, little misunderstandings have escalated to religious conflicts, and some neighborhoods are now predominately Christian, while others are Muslim.

<sup>94</sup> The Ife-Modakeke crisis was a violent communal clash between Ife and Modakeke communities in Oyo state located in southwestern Nigeria. Although land disputes have existed for decades, the violence from 1998 to 2004 resulted in the death of thousands of people.

<sup>95</sup> The ethno-religious violence in Jos started in September 2001 when a Christian was appointed chairman of a local government. The protest led to the deaths of more than 160 people and from then on there had been violent killings almost akin to genocide in some cases. The complexity of the crisis overwhelmed the police, and Joint Task Force was established to intervene between the warring communities. According to Human Rights Watch, 4,000–7,000 people have been killed due to ethno-religious violence in Jos since 2001.

<sup>96</sup> B. Salawu, "Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Causal Analysis and Proposals for New Mangement Strategies," *European Journal of Social Science* 13, no. 3 (2010) 345–47; Olufunmilayo E. Thontteh, Oluseyi O. Fabiyi, and Paul Borisade, "Spatial and Social Dimensions of Post Conflict Urban Reconstruction Programme in South Western Nigeria. The Case of Ile-Ife, Nigeria," *Journal of Settlements and Spatial Planning* 3, no. 2 (2012):165–67.

<sup>97</sup> Salawu, "Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria," 346.



### **3. Militancy and Oil Theft in the Niger Delta**

Militancy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria remains a major national security threat despite the federal government of Nigeria's amnesty agreement in 2009. The major militant groups that existed before the amnesty were the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Even after the amnesty agreement, the erstwhile militants still see themselves as the defenders of the Niger Delta people who have suffered neglect for decades in spite of the region's huge oil resources. Indeed, the oil industry has inspired some of the militancy and violence among the groups, angry over environmental degradation from oil spillage and gas flaring that is connected to the destruction of fishery habitat and agricultural land—the main means of livelihood for the locals.

The militants capitalized on these environmental problems and hazards to perpetrate all sorts of crimes in the name of righting wrongs, and these actions have had significant effects on Nigeria's oil production capacity. The crimes include damaging and destroying the oil pipelines, stealing oil, and kidnapping of foreign oil workers for ransom. Kidnapping is aimed at the foreign employees of multinational companies, who covertly or overtly pay huge ransoms to the Niger Delta militants. For instance, on May 4, 2014, three Dutch workers were kidnapped in Delta state.<sup>100</sup> Nigeria now ranks third, after Mexico and India, among the top 20 countries in the world with the highest kidnapping rate.<sup>101</sup>

In a move to stop this criminality, the government granted amnesty to all the militants. The amnesty agreement required the militants to hand over arms, ammunition, and equipment to the government and to give up criminal acts. For its part, the government promised reforms and other immediate benefits to the militants. The central government also inaugurated rehabilitation and reintegration programs for the ex-

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<sup>100</sup> IHS, "Nigeria Security," 6.

<sup>101</sup> Steven Perlberg, "The 20 Countries Where People Get Kidnapped the Most," *Business Insider*, December 12, 2013, <http://www.businessinsider.com/top-20-countries-by-kidnapping-2013-12#ixzz38EQ793LH>.

militants. It is estimated that Nigeria spends more than \$400 million every year for the amnesty program.

Despite these huge sums of money spent on the post-amnesty program, militancy and criminality, especially oil theft and kidnappings, continue in the Niger Delta. Most of the criminality is blamed on disaffected militants who either are dissatisfied with the amnesty package or perhaps prefer to make easy money from oil theft instead of reintegrating into society. The ramifications of their activities are the further degradation of the environment from destroyed oil pipelines and the high loss of revenue to the country. Nigeria loses about N400 million (US \$2 million) daily because of illegal oil activities.

#### **4. Piracy**

Piracy is a major security concern for Nigeria in particular and the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) in general. Most of Nigeria's deep-water oil platforms are in the GOG, and the GOG and Nigerian territorial waters house many multinational oil companies from the United States, Europe, and Asia. Additionally, more than 90 percent of Nigeria's international trade transits the GOG. At the same time, the GOG is plagued with a high incidence of piracy, criminality, sea robbery, and kidnapping. As a result, the international maritime organization ranked Nigeria No. 1 in global pirate attacks before the Somali pirates came on stage in 2008. Unfortunately, Nigeria is gradually reclaiming this dubious distinction with increasing attacks and criminality in the Nigerian waters and the GOG by Nigerian militants. The international maritime bureau's (IMBs) data on the seven countries with the highest rate of pirate attacks in 2013 (Figure 4) reveals that Nigeria recorded 31 attacks, making it second only to Indonesia, which had 106 attacks.




Figure 4. Seven Countries with the Highest Number of Pirate Attacks in 2013.<sup>102</sup>

Interestingly, Somalia witnessed only seven such piracy incidents in the same period, which may be a result of the activities of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).<sup>103</sup>

The IMB's 2013 report on piracy and armed robbery against ships, summarized in Table 1, shows that piracy was declining in and around Nigeria—down to ten incidents in 2011.

<sup>102</sup> IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships" (London: IMB, 2013), 5.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

Table 1. Location of Actual and Attempted Attacks, 2009–2013.<sup>104</sup>

Locations	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
<b>AFRICA</b>					
Algeria				1	
Angola			1		
Benin	1		20	2	
Cameroon	3	5		1	
Dem. Republic of Congo	2	3	4	2	
Egypt		2	3	7	7
Gabon					2
Ghana	3		2	2	1
Guinea	5	6	5	3	1
Guinea Bissau	1				
Gulf of Aden*	117	53	37	13	6
Ivory Coast	2	4	1	5	4
Kenya	1		1	1	1
Liberia		1			
Mauritania					1
Morocco					1
Mozambique				2	2
Nigeria	29	19	10	27	31
Red Sea**	15	25	39	13	2
Sierra Leone			1	1	2
Somalia	80	139	160	49	7
Tanzania	5	1		2	1
The Congo		1	3	4	3
Togo	2		6	15	7

However, there was a sharp increase in piracy incidents in 2012 and 2013, respectively. This trend holds for the GOG region. Furthermore, as of April 2014, Nigeria has recorded more than 12 attacks. Prominent among these attacks were the attack of *MT Kerela* of Angola on January 18, 2014, and the attack on *SP Brussel* on April 29, 2014. The pirates stole about 12,270 metric tons of diesel fuel from *MT Kerela* before releasing the vessel. In the case of *SP Brussels*, the chief engineer and two pirates were killed.

The audacity of the pirates suggests that they operated as part of a well-coordinated criminal network with intelligence on the products the target vessels were carrying. It is also alleged that Niger Delta militants or the post-amnesty splinter groups prefer the lucrative returns of piracy rather than taking part in the amnesty programs. Also, pirates act with some impunity, stemming from the size of the area relative to the Nigerian Navy's capacity to patrol, which makes it easy for such criminality to thrive.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 6.

## 5. Health and Infectious Disease Threats

Health and infectious disease threats are increasingly becoming serious security threats in Nigeria and the SSA. These threats have global ramifications because of the easy movement of people across the continents. Some of the prominent diseases include malaria, tuberculosis, hepatitis, cholera, typhoid, HIV/AIDS, and most recently Ebola virus disease (EVD), formerly known as Ebola hemorrhagic fever. Table 2 shows the fatal diseases and the corresponding deaths from 2007 to 2011.

Table 2. Diseases and the Reported Cases of Deaths in Nigeria, 2007–2011.<sup>105</sup>

TYPE OF DISEASE	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
CHOLERA	185	-	-	382	347
MENINGGITIS(CSM)	301	-	-	267	47
VIRAL INFLUENZA	-	-	-	8	1
DIARHOEA(BLOOD)	1,038	-	-	935	636
DIARHOEA(NON BLOOD)	2,500	-	-	245	195
MEASLES	230	1,670	-	189	336
HEPATITIS B	51	55	-	59	19
RABIES (HUMAN)	-	-	-	4	-
LASSA FEVER	20	19	-	18	31
MALARIA	10,506	-	-	2,620	3,222
PNEUMONIA	1,141	1,428	-	852	440
TUBERCULOSIS	245	1,562	-	521	122
TETANUS(N)	155	69	-	114	52
LEPROSY	2	12	-	-	3
FILARIASIS	2	8	-	-	4
ONCHOCERCIASIS(R.BLDNESS)	-	1	-	5	1
SCHISTOMIASIS	-	-	-	-	1
HIV/AIDS	740	925	-	634	467
ALL	17,116	5,749	-	6,853	5,924

The data also reveals a general decrease in death rates from 2007 to 2011. For, example malaria-related deaths decreased drastically from 10, 506 deaths to 3,222 deaths while HIV/AIDS decreased from 740 deaths to 467 deaths. The absence of EVD in the data shows that it was not a health threat in Nigeria before 2014. Nevertheless, this section will focus on HIV/AIDS and the EVD.

<sup>105</sup> Yemi Kale, *NBS Social Statistics on Nigeria 2012-Part III: Health, Employment, Public Safety, Population, and Vital Registration* (Nigeria: National Bureau for Statistics, 2013), 15.

HIV/AIDS as a security challenge comes from the development of a human security paradigm as part of the security agenda of most countries.<sup>106</sup> In Africa, Sandra Joireman reckons that “it is the pervasiveness of the disease and the lack of treatment that multiplies its effect to the point that it becomes a security issue for states.”<sup>107</sup> For example, former South African President Thabo Mbeki contended that HIV was a Western conspiracy and did not place HIV/AIDS issues as a priority, while many other countries lack the resources to treat or prevent the pandemic.<sup>108</sup>

The prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria is about 3.5 percent.<sup>109</sup> As of 2013, the estimated deaths from AIDS were about 220,100. More than 414,000 people are receiving anti-retroviral treatment, while about 34,000 women are receiving treatment for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission.<sup>110</sup> The figure is better than in South Africa, with a prevalence infection rate of 10 percent to 25 percent.<sup>111</sup> Still, a further look at the statistics reveals that the people affected are overwhelmingly adults. Considering that 40 percent of the current Nigerian population is under 15 years of age, morbidity and mortality among the adults for HIV/AIDS will create a huge vacuum in various sectors of the economy. Research also reveals that HIV/AIDS is more prevalent among the security forces than the civilians.<sup>112</sup> Thus, an infected security force will be able to contribute to neither national nor regional security imperatives.

EVD has become a major security threat, not only to Africa but also to the entire world. The infection and death rates of the March 2014 EVD outbreak in Liberia, Guinea,

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<sup>106</sup> Jacqui Ala, “Aids as a New Security Threat,” in *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 131.

<sup>107</sup> Sandra F. Joireman, “HIV/AIDS in Africa and Us National Security,” UCLA International Institute, April 30, 2004, <http://www1.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=107610>.

<sup>108</sup> New York Times, “Thabo Mbeki and AIDS,” *New York Times*, November 4, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/04/opinion/thabo-mbeki-and-aids.html>.

<sup>109</sup> UNICEF, “At a Glance: Nigeria,” December 27, 2013, [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nigeria\\_statistics.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nigeria_statistics.html).

<sup>110</sup> PEPFAR, “Partnership to Fight HIV/AIDS in Nigeria,” accessed August 7, 2014, <http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/199599.pdf>.

<sup>111</sup> Ploch, “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” 17.

<sup>112</sup> Guy Martin, “HIV/AIDS Biggest Threat to African Militaries,” April 19, 2013, [http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=30209:hiv-aids-biggest-threat-to-african-militaries--africom&catid=52:Human%20Security&Itemid=114](http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30209:hiv-aids-biggest-threat-to-african-militaries--africom&catid=52:Human%20Security&Itemid=114).

and Sierra Leone have shocked the world. It simply takes one infected person to travel to another country undetected and potentially spread the disease, as was the case of the Liberians who traveled to Nigeria and the United States.<sup>113</sup> Table 3 shows the total case count, total deaths, and the laboratory confirmed cases of EVD by country.

Table 3. EVD Statistics by Country March–September 2014.<sup>114</sup>

<b>Country</b>	<b>Total Cases</b>	<b>Total Number of Deaths</b>	<b>Laboratory Confirmed Cases</b>
Guinea	1022	635	832
Liberia	3820	1677	890
Nigeria	20	8	19
Senegal	1940	597	1745
Sierra Leone	1	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>6263</b>	<b>2917</b>	<b>3487</b>

The data shows that as of September 25, 2014, there has been a total case count of 6,263 persons, total deaths of 2,917 persons, and total of 3,487 laboratory-confirmed cases. Nigeria has a total case count of 20 persons, total deaths of 8 persons, and total laboratory-confirmed cases of 19 persons. Only one case has been confirmed in Senegal

<sup>113</sup> CBS News, “Ebola Outbreak’s Long, Winding Path to U.S. Shores,” CBS News, October 5, 2014, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ebola-outbreaks-long-winding-path-to-us-shores/>; USA TODAY, “Nigeria Death Shows Ebola Can Spread by Air Travel,” July 26, 2014, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/07/26/nigeria-death-shows-ebola-can-spread-by-air-travel/13215429/>.

<sup>114</sup> Center for Disease Control, “2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa,” CDC, <http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/guinea/>.

with no deaths. The high death figure in Liberia, Guinea, and Senegal casts doubt on the healthcare system and capacity of the medical personnel to handle the epidemic.<sup>115</sup>

At least four Americans have been evacuated from Africa due to EVD infection.<sup>116</sup> Additionally, the U.S. government has pledged to provide assistance to mitigate the menace of the epidemic. In a special session during the UN conference of September 2014, President Obama stressed the need for African leaders to upgrade their healthcare systems because the United States' assistance alone will not solve the problem.<sup>117</sup> Furthermore, Nigeria was commended for its swift action in containing Ebola, as no new cases have been reported since August 31, 2014.<sup>118</sup> Unlike the other affected countries, Nigeria was able to utilize the support provided by the U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC) at federal and state levels because of its existing capacity on the ground.<sup>119</sup> This point underscores the need for building and sustaining on-ground-capacity to meet different healthcare contingencies in Africa.

## **B. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF INSECURITY IN NIGERIA**

Generally, the drivers of insecurity in a country can be categorized as either internal or external. Achumba et al. argue that internal sources are the key drivers of insecurity in Nigeria.<sup>120</sup> The internal root causes that ramify most in Nigeria include weak institutions, illiteracy, poverty, and porous borders.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> CIDRAP, "Very Few Aircraft Equipped to Evacuate Ebola Patients," Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, September 16, 2014, <http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2014/09/very-few-aircraft-equipped-evacuate-ebola-patients>.

<sup>117</sup> Voice of America, "Obama: Ebola Threat to 'Regional, Global Security'," VOA, September 25, 2014, <http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-to-address-un-ebola-meeting/2462000.html>.

<sup>118</sup> James S. Brady, "Press Briefing on Government Response to the Ebola Epidemic in West Africa, October 3, 2014," White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/03/press-briefing-government-response-ebola-epidemic-west-africa-1032014>.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> I.C Achumba, "Security Challenges in Nigeria," 80.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 81–83.

## **1. Weak Government Institutions**

Weak government institutions have fueled insecurity tremendously in Nigeria. The weak institutions include weak regulatory agencies, ineffective judicial-legal institutions, weak public service, and weak political institutions. The government interferes with the activities of most of the regulatory institutions. For example, the governor of Nigerian Central Bank was forced to resign after his request for the executive to account for a missing \$20 billion dollars.<sup>122</sup>

The decay and lack of such basic infrastructure as power, water, and good roads reflect the weakness of the public service in Nigeria. Political institutions responsible for oversight have often been found to prefer corruption over accountability—for themselves as well as the areas of the public sector that they oversee. For instance, a House of Representatives committee on power was alleged to have received an N100-million bribe to distort the report.<sup>123</sup>

In terms of legal institutions, Joachim contends, “The rise of sharia in Nigeria is a powerful illustration of a civil society forced to find alternatives to a state that has broken its social contract to protect its citizens.”<sup>124</sup> Islamic clerics capitalize on weakness in law enforcement and civil disorder, using militias for protection and the legitimization of sharia law.<sup>125</sup> These militias sometimes take the law into their hands and their ranks are potential recruits for terrorists group like Boko Haram.<sup>126</sup>

## **2. Illiteracy**

Illiteracy is predominant in northern Nigeria, which has now become a cauldron of violent extremism and terrorism as exemplified by the Boko Haram. A literacy survey

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<sup>122</sup> Robert Looney, “The Boko Haram Economy,” *Foreign Policy*, July 15, 2014, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/15/the\\_boko\\_haram\\_economy](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/15/the_boko_haram_economy).

<sup>123</sup> Samson Adesote and John Ojo Abimbola, “Corruption and National Development in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: A Historical Discourse,” *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* 14, no. 7 (2012): 88.

<sup>124</sup> Joachim, “Draining the Swamp,” 161.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 161.

conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics in Nigeria and released in 2010 estimates the adult literacy rate at 56.9 percent, with huge variations between states (Lagos at 92.0 percent versus Borno, with only 14.5 percent), regions (urban, 74.6 percent; rural 48.7 percent), and gender (male 65.1 percent; female 48.6 percent).<sup>127</sup> The dismal literacy level in Borno state speaks volumes about why Boko Haram chose the state to begin its operations in the first place. Data from UNESCO's Institute of Statistics (Figure 5) reveal that youth ranging from 15 to 24 in age constitute much of the illiterate population in Nigeria.




Figure 5. Illiterate Population in Nigeria.<sup>128</sup>

The data reveal that in 2008, a total of some 6.1 million young females and 3.6 million young males in Nigeria counted as illiterate. In terms of percentage, Figure 5 shows that there is a troubling downward trend in literacy from 1990 to 2010. For example, the literacy rate of young males decreased from about 80 percent in 1990 to about 75 percent in 2010.

<sup>127</sup> UNESCO, *Action Plan for Nigeria* (Paris, France: UNESCO, 2012), 1.

<sup>128</sup> UNESCO, *Adult and Youth Literacy 1990–2015: Analysis of Data for 41 Selected Countries* (Montreal, Canada: UNESCO-UIS, 2012).

A variety of political, cultural, and economic factors accounts for the decline in the literacy rate in Nigeria.<sup>129</sup> Politically, poor wages for teachers and poor infrastructure may be responsible for the decline in literacy rate. Culturally, most Muslims in northern Nigeria combine the Islamic (Koranic) education with formal education but more fundamentalist Muslims, especially in remote areas, lay more emphasis on Islamic education.<sup>130</sup> Economically, the downtrend in literacy may be a direct consequence of poverty and the inability of some Nigerians to even take advantage of such government initiatives as universal basic education and other mass literacy initiatives.<sup>131</sup>

UNESCO further made a comparison between the literacy rate among the population under 24 years of age and the population above 65 years (Figure 6).




Figure 6. Literacy Rate in Nigeria.<sup>132</sup>

The data supports the argument of most scholars that illiteracy keeps many people from comprehending and acquiring the necessary skills for employment and by extension

<sup>129</sup> Victor E. Dike, "Tackling Nigeria's Dwindling Literacy Rate," Nigerian Village Square, March 2, 2009, <http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/victor-dike/tackling-nigerias-dwindling-literacy-rate.html>.

<sup>130</sup> UNESCO, "Action Plan for Nigeria," 3.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., 4; Dike, "Dwindling Literacy Rate."

<sup>132</sup> UNESCO, *Adult and Youth Literacy 1990-2015*, 59.

solving their socio-economic problems. In Nigeria, illiteracy and idleness have made the youth potential targets for all sorts of criminality and extremism.

### **3. Poverty and Unemployment**

Poverty is another catalyst for insecurity in Nigeria. Despite enormous resources and wealth, most Nigerians still live in abject poverty. For example, World Bank data show that about 46 percent of the total population lives below the poverty line. As of 2010, about 50.2 percent of Nigerians live on less than \$2 dollars a day. Notably, Nigeria's monthly living wage or minimum wage was about N7,500 naira (about US\$1.60 a day) until 2011.<sup>133</sup> That year, the Nigerian senate passed a bill increasing the minimum wage to N18,000 monthly (US\$109 monthly or \$3.64 a day).<sup>134</sup> However, most states, especially in impoverished northern Nigerian have not been able to comply with the provisions of the bill.

The data from the National Bureau for Statistics in Nigeria (Figure 7) shows that unemployment has increased from less than 10 million people in 2006 to about 17 million in 2011.

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<sup>133</sup> Victor Olapojoye, "Nigeria: The Living Wage Question," Living Wage NYC, April 12, 2011, <http://www.livingwagennyc.org/articles/detail.php?id=495>.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.




Figure 7. Unemployed Population in Nigeria.<sup>135</sup>

Unemployment is closely related to poverty, as most of the poor people are either unemployed or underemployed. What is most worrisome is that most of those affected are the young. For instance, according to the National Bureau for Statistics, Nigeria (Figure 8), the percentage of unemployed persons based on age distribution is more than 35 percent of Nigerians aged 15–25 years and about 22 percent for those aged 25–44 years.

<sup>135</sup> UNESCO, “Action Plan for Nigeria”; National Bureau for Statistics, “Revised and Final Results by Output Approach,” <http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/nbslibrary/economic-statistics/gross-domestic-product>.




Figure 8. Unemployed Population in Nigeria.<sup>136</sup>

The implication of these statistics is that the segment of Nigerian society that should be most vibrant and active is unemployed.

With the unemployment rate coupled with the high poverty rate, extremist groups brainwash the youth and entice them with promises of a better life than the government can provide. Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria used this strategy for recruitment. Additionally, most of the militants in the Niger Delta were unemployed or had menial jobs before joining the groups.

#### 4. Porous Borders

The length and porosity of the international land borders between Nigeria and the Republics of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Mali is also responsible for a range of crimes and insecurity of Nigeria. These borders have been continuously used for the trafficking of arms, humans, and drugs, which has connections to such major security challenges as piracy and terrorism. Most literature seems to agree that the main source of revenue for Boko Haram is drug trafficking through Nigeria's porous borders. The terrorists also use the ungoverned border areas as sanctuaries. As W. O. Alli aptly notes, "In Nigeria's

<sup>136</sup> National Bureau for Statistics, "Revised and Final Results by Output Approach."

northern borders with Niger and Chad, armed bandits enter Nigeria at will to terrorize innocent citizens in towns and villages on the Nigerian side of the border.”<sup>137</sup>

Similarly, the porosity of the northeastern borders has made Nigeria’s counterterrorism efforts quite difficult. Furthermore, small arms and light weapons stolen from the crises in Libya have found their way into Nigeria through the ungoverned large border areas in the north.<sup>138</sup>

### **C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

The demographics and current trends of Nigeria’s security challenges coupled with its underlying causes are not encouraging. The analyses reveal that terrorism is the most daunting security challenge in Nigeria today. The lethality and audacity of Boko Haram attacks have continued to damage the prestige of the Nigerian security agencies. Notably, the U.S. government designation of Boko Haram as a foreign terrorist organization on November 13, 2013, speaks volumes on the atrocities of the group. Additionally, the United States assistance and France President’s African security conference in Paris have bolstered the regional agreement between countries bordering northern Nigeria, such as Chad, the Niger Republic, Cameroon, and Mali, to combat Boko Haram.

The continuation of the Niger Delta militancy on a lesser scale questions the efficacy of the ongoing amnesty program. The splinter groups of the erstwhile militant groups have been responsible for crimes like attacks on oil facilities, oil pipeline vandalism, and oil theft. Piracy and sea robbery have also increased with Nigeria ranking second behind Indonesia in 2013 according to the IMB reports on piracy and attacks on ships. Health and infectious disease threats especially the recent EVD outbreak have exposed the weakness of the healthcare system of most African countries. Nonetheless, the low EVD death figures and confirmed cases in Nigeria do not necessarily mean an effective healthcare system and capacity.

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<sup>137</sup> W. O Alli, *Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy* (Abuja, Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2012), 60.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

The chapter also finds that the security challenges will continue to increase if the underlying causes, which are mostly humanitarian in nature, are not addressed. For instance, illiteracy, poverty, and unemployment predominant among the youth have increased their vulnerability to terrorists and criminal activities. Therefore, U.S. security initiatives and programs coupled with Nigerian government efforts must be re-examined to determine the gaps between programs and outcomes.

### **III. ASSESSMENT OF U.S. SECURITY INITIATIVES IN NIGERIA**

An assessment of U.S. security initiatives in Nigeria will help ascertain the gaps or disconnects that hinder progress. U.S. foreign policy has global, regional, and national paradigms. Under each paradigm, multiple programs are primarily run by the DOS and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The DOD has its own dedicated programs but also drives some DOS/USAID programs. In some cases, the programs overlap and prevent smooth execution.

In Africa, the Bureau of African Affairs ensures issues are addressed and U.S. foreign policy objectives are met. Additionally, the U.S. Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, promulgated in June 2012, reflects the U.S. government's commitment to developing a partnership based on mutual commitment and respect.<sup>139</sup> Nonetheless, U.S. national security imperatives and priorities determine its level of commitment at any given time. For instance, inconsistency in U.S. strategy, such as the intervention in Libya against inaction in Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), supports this narrative.<sup>140</sup> Notably, all U.S. security initiatives in Nigeria fit within the subsets of the overall U.S. strategy toward SSA.

#### **A. U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

U.S. strategy toward SSA has four distinct pillars.<sup>141</sup> The first pillar is to strengthen democratic institutions; the second is to promote economic growth, trade, and investment; the third is to advance peace and security, including countering terrorism, security cooperation and security sector reforms, and mitigating mass atrocities, among other things; and the fourth is to promote opportunity and development.<sup>142</sup> In order to

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<sup>139</sup> U.S. Government, *United States Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. The White House (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 26.

<sup>140</sup> Barry Neiid, "Oil vs. Cocoa: Why Ivory Coast Isn't Like Libya," CNN, April 5, 2011, <http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/04/04/ivory.coast.libya/index.html>.

<sup>142</sup> U.S. Government, *United States Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2.

execute these objectives, the United States initiated several hard- and soft-power security initiatives, which will be addressed in the following sections.

## **B. HARD-POWER PROGRAMS**

The hard-power programs include USAFRICOM's programs, Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) Program, counterterrorism programs, and maritime security programs. The overarching objective of these programs is to strengthen the military capability and professionalism of partner nations in order to enhance national, regional, and global peace.<sup>143</sup> Nonetheless, most of the programs do not have standard metrics by which to measure effectiveness. In addition, the gap between training and implementation, the dilemma between human rights abuses and assistance level, and incapacity of partner nations affect the outcomes.<sup>144</sup>

### **1. USAFRICOM**

USAFRICOM was first established as a sub-unified command under the European Command (EUCOM) on October 1, 2007. It became an independent unified command with headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, on October 1, 2008.<sup>145</sup> African leaders' suspicion of U.S. intentions, resistance, and project cost at inception were important factors in keeping AFRICOM's headquarters outside the continent.<sup>146</sup> Six years after establishment of AFRICOM, the issues regarding its permanent location still resonate among U.S. politicians and military leaders. For instance, some politicians want AFRICOM to be located in the United States because it will save the U.S. government

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<sup>143</sup> Curf Tarnoff, *Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy*, (CRS Report No. R40213) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 3–4. <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40213.pdf>

<sup>144</sup> GAO, "Actions Needed," 3.

<sup>145</sup> Lauren Ploch, *Africa Command: US Strategic Interest and Role of the U.S. Military*, (CRS Report No. RL34003) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 1. <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf>

<sup>146</sup> Lamb, "Parading U.S Security Interests as African Security Policy," 51.

about \$70 million yearly and create about 4,300 jobs.<sup>147</sup> Military leaders, on the other hand, contend that the proximity to the African continent and complementarity of EUCOM make Stuttgart operationally more effective.<sup>148</sup> Nevertheless, GAO recommends that DOD needs to conduct a more comprehensive cost benefit analysis on the permanent location of AFRICOM.<sup>149</sup>

According to the DOD, “AFRICOM’s mission is to promote U.S. strategic objectives and protect U.S. interests in the region by working with African partners to strengthen their defense capabilities so that they are better able to contribute to regional stability and security.”<sup>150</sup> AFRICOM’s five subordinate commands facilitate the attainment of its mission. These commands are the U.S. Army Africa, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, U.S. Air Forces Africa, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa, CJTF-HOA, and U.S. Special Operations Command Africa.<sup>151</sup> AFRICOM covers a wide range of contingencies to help partner countries gain the necessary skills in combatting Africa’s security challenges. However, most programs are not country-specific and scenarios may not be tailored to solve a particular country’s challenges. Thus, in the final analysis the intended outcomes would either not be achieved or take a longer time to be achieved. Additionally, it may be more costly if the problems become more complex like the case of terrorism and maritime crimes in Nigeria.

AFRICOM uses security cooperation, exercises, and operations in support of its mission and U.S. foreign policy.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> John Pendleton, *DOD Needs to Reassess Options for Permanent Location of U.S. Africa Command* (GAO-13-646) (Washington, D C: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), 10. <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-646>

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>150</sup> Ploch, *Africa Command*, ii.

<sup>151</sup> U.S. Africa Command, “What We Do,” AFRICOM, <http://www.africom.mil>.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

*a. Security Cooperation Programs*

Theater Security Cooperation Programs (TSCP) include ACOTA programs, the TSCTP, and the APS. APS is a maritime security cooperation program. AFRICOM and NAVAF carry out various maritime-security trainings using mobile training teams on the APS (a designated U.S. Navy ship). Additionally, personnel from African navies join the APS for three to six months for on-the-job training.<sup>153</sup> The training is to develop capacity of the participants in counter-piracy and maritime interdiction operations against crimes such as drug trafficking and human trafficking.

*b. Exercises*

AFRICOM exercises are designed to train African partners on specific priority capacity-building areas. For example, Exercise FLINTLOCK is focused on training TSCTP nations in special forces operations for protecting civilians and denying terrorists safe haven; Exercise ENDEAVOR is designed to improve communication procedures/ interoperability, and Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS involves counter-piracy and counter-narcotics in the West African maritime domain.<sup>154</sup> These exercises are hosted by a designated partner nation. For instance, the Nigerian Navy hosted Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS 2014.<sup>155</sup> The exercise took place April 16–23, 2014, and involved 11 nations on 36 different vessels. During the exercise, 47 boarding drills were carried out.

The exercise was adjudged to be successful by observers from the United States and partner countries. For instance, at the closing ceremony, the Nigerian Chief of the Naval Staff Vice Admiral Usman O. Jibrin noted that “I have observed the actions and proceeding of the exercise and I am happy with the outcome.” His comment supports the efficacy of U.S. security programs.<sup>156</sup> However, the United States has no strategy to

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup>“Obangame Express,” USAFRICOM, <http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/obangame-express>.

<sup>156</sup> Westton Jones, “Obangame Express 2014 Concludes,” U.S Navy, April 23, 2014, [http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story\\_id=80539](http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=80539).

monitor implementation after the training, which may explain the increase in maritime crime after the exercise.<sup>157</sup> Consequently, the U.S. government requires a comprehensive implementation strategy for its security programs.

**c. Operations**

Operations involve African partners and other international allies. For instance, Operation ODYSSEY DAWN, which was an air campaign over Libya, involved NATO countries. Although NATO mostly drove Operation ODYSSEY DAWN, conspiracy theorists believed it was a U.S. operation. However, such operations improve interoperability and capacity of African forces when operating in a multinational environment. Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS focused on training partners against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, while Operation ONWARD LIBERTY was a mentoring operation designed to transform the Liberian military.<sup>158</sup> In the case of Uganda, U.S. national security priorities against violent extremism and the LRA downplayed full sanctions despite obvious human rights abuses.<sup>159</sup> For example, the Ugandan government's passing of anti-gay law did not attract full sanctions from the United States.<sup>160</sup> If U.S. assistance to the Ugandan Army stops, the United States' GWOT against the Somali terrorists, Al Shabaab, would be affected. Such a selective approach questions the U.S. threshold for human rights abuses, especially in the case of Nigeria.

**2. Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)**

In 2002, ACOTA replaced the Africa Crisis Response Initiative, which was established in 1997 to build the capacity of African countries in humanitarian and peace

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<sup>157</sup> Pendleton, *Actions Needed*, 20.

<sup>158</sup> U.S. Africa Command, "What We Do."

<sup>159</sup> Grant Harris and Stephen Pomper, "Further U.S. Efforts to Protect Human Rights in Uganda," White House, June 19, 2014, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/06/19/further-us-efforts-protect-human-rights-uganda>.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid.

support operations.<sup>161</sup> ACOTA is a DOS program within the regional office of the Bureau of African Affairs, but AFRICOM provides it with mentors and advisers.<sup>162</sup> When the Global Peace Operation Initiative (GPOI) was founded in 2004, ACOTA became one of its main instruments.<sup>163</sup> GPOI was a U.S. response to the G-8 action plan to build global capacity for UN peacekeeping operations.<sup>164</sup>

One of the objectives of ACOTA is to bolster regional peace, humanitarian, and disaster relief capabilities on the African continent. These capabilities are expected to prepare African nations more effectively to take responsibility for crises or humanitarian problems, thereby achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives. Thus, ACOTA focuses on enhancing the cooperation of partner nations through multinational training programs and common doctrine.

ACOTA has 25 partner countries, including Nigeria, that have benefited from non-lethal equipment and training. It is estimated that some 254,228 military personnel in 257 contingents have received training. As part of the ACOTA's objective of building the partner country's capacity for peace support operations training, Nigeria has established a peacekeeping center in Jaji Military Cantonment, Kaduna. Table 4 shows the number of peacekeepers trained in select partner African countries.

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<sup>161</sup> U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, "Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)," 5, [http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/INDEXES/Vol%2030\\_4/U.S.%20Africa%20Command%20Public%20Affairs.pdf](http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/INDEXES/Vol%2030_4/U.S.%20Africa%20Command%20Public%20Affairs.pdf).

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>163</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Global Peace Operations Initiative," DOS, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/>.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*

Table 4. Peacekeepers and Peacekeeper Trainers Trained, 2005–2009.<sup>165</sup>

Region/Country/ Organization	Total # Peacekeepers Trained	Total # Peacekeeper Trainers Trained	Total #
Mali	880	130	1,010
Mauritania - Suspended	284	20	304
Mozambique	868	161	1,029
Namibia	817	71	888
Niger – Suspended	1,041	107	1,121
Nigeria	9,463	586	10,049
Rwanda	4,789	92	4,881
Senegal	7,829	435	8,264
South Africa	211	114	325
Tanzania	775	24	799
Uganda	4,149	137	4,286
Zambia	563	113	676

Table 4 shows that as of 2009, Nigeria was the foremost beneficiary of ACOTA, with 9,463 peacekeepers trained and 586 peacekeeper trainers trained. Apart from the recent engagement of the Nigerian security agencies in the fight against Boko Haram, Nigerian contingents have continued to play a pivotal role in sub-regional and regional peacekeeping efforts. Nevertheless, the skills gained from ACOTA training may not necessarily translate to the skills required to combat terrorism.

### 3. Counterterrorism Programs and Training

U.S. counterterrorism (CT) programs and training cover a wide spectrum of activities against the backdrop of the GWOT and the metastasizing nature of the current wave of terror. The CT programs include the TSCTP, Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS), Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA), and Counter Violence Extremism (CVE).<sup>166</sup> The TSCTP was established in 2005 to build the capacity of African partners in counterterrorism. It was originally designed for the Sahel region

<sup>165</sup> Nina M. Serafino, *The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress* (CRS Report No. RL32773) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 18. <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32773.pdf>

<sup>166</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Programs and Initiatives,” DOS, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/>.

(Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger) under the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), but later extended to Nigeria, Senegal, and Cameroon.<sup>167</sup>

The objective of the TSCTP is to develop partner nations' capacity to counter violent extremism, improve border and customs operations, and bolster financial intelligence.<sup>168</sup> TSCTP is a multi-agency program executed by the DOS, USAID, and the DOD.<sup>169</sup> Figure 9 shows the analysis of the GAO on the respective activities of the three core agencies.




Figure 9. TSCTP Activities versus the Agencies.<sup>170</sup>

The figure shows that public diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and the support for vulnerable populations overlap between the agencies. Also the issues of interagency coordination resulting in different TSCTP missions have been identified as a major impediment to the effectiveness of the TSCTP.<sup>171</sup> Unless such multiple bureaucracies are

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.

<sup>168</sup> Lesley Warner, "Nine Questions About the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership You Were Too Embarrassed to Ask," War on the Rocks, April 8, 2014, [http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/nine-questions-about-the-trans-sahara-counter-terrorism-partnership-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask/#\\_](http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/nine-questions-about-the-trans-sahara-counter-terrorism-partnership-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask/#_).

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> Pendleton, *Actions Needed*, 14.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., 4.

reduced or eliminated, the U.S. security initiatives will not achieve their intended outcomes.

TSCTP is funded from the peacekeeping operations funds, the economic support fund, and the non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs funds. In 2007, 74 percent of the TSCTP obligated fund went to the Sahel region, 8 percent to Nigeria and Senegal, and 3 percent to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.<sup>172</sup> TSCTP obligated funds according to country and region are depicted in Figure 10.




Figure 10. TSCTP Obligated Funds Allocated to Countries and Regions, 2009–2013.<sup>173</sup>

Figure 10 shows that even as of 2013 Nigeria has received only US\$12.8 million despite the designation of Boko Haram as an FTO due to its increased lethality. Human rights abuses have been one of the main reasons stalling counterterrorism assistance to

<sup>172</sup> GlobalSecurity.org, “Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP),” GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm>.

<sup>173</sup> Pendleton, *Combating Terrorism*, i.

Nigeria.<sup>174</sup> It is therefore important for the U.S. government to work with Nigeria toward improving respect for human rights rather than letting problems escalate.

The Sahel countries not only received more than US\$30 million but also got US\$81.8 million for the regional TSCTP. Figure 11 gives a breakdown of country-level funding from 2005 to 2007.




Figure 11. Distribution of Funds for USAID and DOS TSCTP Activities, 2005–2007.<sup>175</sup>

The statistics in Figure 11 reveal a significant fluctuation in funding especially in Mali, Mauritania, and Morocco. The 2005 coup in Mauritania was responsible for the reduced funding in 2006, but in Mali, reduced funding in 2006 was not fully justified, and it resulted in the suspension of the USAID peace-building project.<sup>176</sup> Nigeria only became a beneficiary of the TSCTP in 2007. Additionally, the regional program had no funding in 2006.

<sup>174</sup> House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations, *Human Rights Vetting: Nigeria and Beyond*, July 10, 2014, 1, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-human-rights-vetting-nigeria-and-beyond>

<sup>175</sup> Pendleton, *Actions Needed*, 25.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

Regional programs also include participants from other countries. For instance, Nigeria has participated in TSCTP regional programs on medical, logistics, communications, and intelligence training against terrorism.<sup>177</sup> At the country level, TSCTP has conducted civil-military relations training, counter-improvised explosive devices (IED) training, and border security and crisis management training in Nigeria. Nevertheless, the effectiveness is doubtful partly because TSCTP does not have standard metrics to measure outcomes.<sup>178</sup>

The ATA covers a wide spectrum of activities and training, which include developing core capabilities in developing a legal framework to ensure that security agencies of partner nations act according to international best practices and rule of law.<sup>179</sup> For example, the customs mutual assistance agreement is a legal framework that allows for the exchange of information and guides partner nations on the prosecution of customs offenses including those related to terrorism. In Nigeria, ATA has developed the capacity of security agencies to prevent, detect, and investigate terrorist threats. It has also bolstered capacity for enhancing border security and managing responses.<sup>180</sup> The beneficiary agencies for the ATA are the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Nigeria Customs Service, and the Nigeria Police Force. One major area in which ATA built capacity in Nigeria was the counter-IED training incorporated into the Nigeria Police training curriculum.<sup>181</sup>

The CVE program is designed to address the underlying causes of extremism and terrorism. Its main focus is to degrade the capacity and ability of terrorist organizations to elicit sympathy and boost recruitment. The CVE initiative involves constant engagement and confidence-building measures between the civil society and the security agencies. It

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<sup>177</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Boko Haram and U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance to Nigeria,” DOS, May 14, 2014, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/226072.htm>.

<sup>178</sup> Pendleton, *Actions Needed*, 26.

<sup>179</sup> GlobalSecurity.org, “Operation Enduring Freedom - Trans Sahara (OEF-TS),” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oef-ts.htm>.

<sup>180</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Antiterrorism Assistance Program,” DOS, <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm>.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

also builds resilience among vulnerable communities, creates counterterrorist propaganda, information operations, and engages women in countering abnormal behavior that could lead to extremism at home and within their communities. Although no statistics are available on the number of Nigerian women who benefited from the CVE program, the rise of Nigerian women against the kidnapped schoolgirls shows an increased level of awareness.

Statistics do reveal that terrorist incidents are increasing in Nigeria, which challenges the effectiveness of the counterterrorism programs.<sup>182</sup> The issue is that the programs may not have addressed the problem in Nigeria because the initial focus of the TSCTP was the Sahel region. It has also been observed that TSCPC lacks a comprehensive strategy on either using the regional approach or the bilateral approach. For example, it was only after Boko Haram's recent abductions that the United States sent special counterterrorism teams to Nigeria.

#### **4. Maritime Security Programs**

Capacity building programs in maritime security include the APS, African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP), maritime exercise, port security partnership, strategic maritime initiatives, and maritime domain awareness. Nigeria has participated in all U.S. initiatives considering its role in GOG security. For instance, Nigeria has actively participated in several AFRICOM's APS maritime security exercises tagged Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS and has benefited from the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) program.

The RMAC system is a DOD—specifically a Department of Navy—program, that would enable partner nations like Nigeria to monitor its maritime domain and the GOG against piracy and other transnational maritime crimes.<sup>183</sup> It is a system of radars and sensors with an integrated automated identification system for tracking ships. The strategy is to install the systems in designated locations along the Nigerian coast for

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<sup>182</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Boko Haram and U.S Counterterrorism."

<sup>183</sup> Nigerian Navy, "Regional Maritime Awareness Capability Conference," Nigerian Navy, <http://www.navy.mil.ng/press/16.news#.U6L7rl64III>.

complete overlap. Currently, the systems have been installed and are fully operational in Lagos and Bonny. The RMAC system has also been installed in the republic and Sao Tome and Principe to overlap and share information with the Nigerian systems for effective regional maritime dominance.

The U.S. Navy has trained several Nigerian Navy officers to operate and maintain the systems. During the RMAC training graduation ceremony held at the Lagos naval base, it was noted that the RMAC system gives a more precise data for Nigerian Navy vessels. Nevertheless, the poor operational state of ships and aircraft may hinder the effectiveness of the RMAC system. Thus, inadequate enforcement capability affects optimal usage of the system.

In spite of all these initiatives, pirate attacks have not been reduced in the GOG.<sup>184</sup> The increase in illegal activities, especially piracy, suggests that the programs have not translated into improved security. This situation also suggests that the programs may not be addressing the problems.<sup>185</sup> Thus, the program should be reviewed to attend to more specific threats coupled with a strategy to acquire the requisite equipment for Nigeria's security agencies.

## **5. Excess Defense Articles Transfer**

Excess Defense Articles (EDA) are U.S. military equipment or materiel in excess of the approved force requirement or retention as enshrined in the U.S. foreign assistance Act of 1961. The articles could be from the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S. Coast Guard. The articles are transferred to U.S. allies, partner countries, or international organizations either on grant or sale. The articles on grant are transferred under the U.S. foreign military financing. The U.S. Congress approves the foreign military financing funds, the DOS allocates the funds for the eligible allies, and the DOD executes the transfer and training. The beneficiary countries of EDA transfer grant pay for the packing, crating, handling, and transportation. Similarly, the articles for sale are transferred under the U.S. foreign

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<sup>184</sup> IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships."

<sup>185</sup> Lyman, "Strategic Approach," 49.

military sale, which also follows due process before approving the sale to the partner government.

The U.S. government agency responsible for coordinating and administering EDA is the Defense and Security Cooperation Agency. EDAs have to be identified by the respective defense agencies before the Defense and Security Cooperation Agency carries out assessments in conjunction with the combatant commands to determine the beneficiary countries. The items are then offered in support of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. Additionally, the equipment helps in the modernization of the recipient nations' security agencies. It also improves the interoperability of U.S. allied countries in multinational arenas and builds their capacity for legitimate self-defense. Despite the robust objective of the EDA, most of the recipients of the EDA are either North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries or traditional allies of the United States. African countries for the most part receive equipment that is no longer in service in the United States. For instance, Table 5 shows that the Nigerian Navy has been granted five U.S. Coast Guard vessels and one U.S. Navy ship. The Nigerian Army has received trailers and heavy trucks.

Table 5. EDA Transfer to Nigeria.<sup>186</sup>

Transfer	Fiscal Year of Request	Implementing Agency	Model	Item Description
Grant	2013	Department of the Navy	T-AGS 51	EX-USNS JOHN MCDONNELL
Grant	2012	Department of the Navy	WHEC 721	CGC GALLATIN HIGH ENDURANCE CUTTER
Grant	2012	Department of the Navy	WHEC 721 O&E	OUTFIT AND EQUIPMENT CGC GALLATIN
Grant	2011	Department of the Navy	WHEC 718	CGC CHASE, HIGH ENDURANCE CUTTER
Grant	2009	Department of the Navy		BUOY TENDER SPARE PARTS
Grant	2001	Department of the Navy	WLM-277	BALSAM CLASS BOUY TENDER (COWSLIP)
Grant	2001	Department of the Navy	WLM-393	BALSAM CLASS BUOY TENDER (FIREBUSH)
Grant	2001	Department of the Navy	WLM-401	BALSAM CLASS BUOY TENDER (SASSAFRASS)
Grant	2001	Department of the Navy	WLM-402	BALSAM CLASS BUOY TENDER (SEDGE)
Grant	2001	Department of the Army	M101A1	TRAILER
Grant	2001	Department of the Army	M813A1	TRUCK, ST
Grant	2001	Department of the Army	M1008	TRUCK, CARGO, 1-1/4 TON
Grant	2001	Department of the Army	M816	TRUCK, WRECKER, 5-TON

<sup>186</sup> Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Excess Defence Articles: EDA Data Base Tool," DSCA, <http://www.dsca.mil/programs/excess-defense-articles-eda>.

Such transfers, while useful to Nigeria, will not adequately address the challenges the Nigerian Navy and the Nigerian Army are facing especially in the contemporary security environment of piracy and terrorism. Furthermore, neither interoperability nor the full realization of U.S. foreign policy can easily be achieved with this equipment. What Nigeria needs is EDA for desert warfare from Iraq and Afghanistan for the fight against Boko Haram. Boko Haram has acquired sophisticated military equipment stolen from Libya after Operation ODYSSEY DAWN and the fall of Gadhafi. Thus, specific and more sophisticated EDAs such as surveillance equipment will more likely yield the desired outcomes of the U.S. security initiative.

### **C. SOFT-POWER PROGRAMS**

The soft-power programs are the security sector reform (SSR), the DOD HIV program, humanitarian assistance programs, and education and training programs. These programs are designed to develop best practices, rule of law, and respect for human rights in the security sector of partner nations.<sup>187</sup> They are also aimed at fostering good relations and building trust between the U.S. forces and the host nation's civil society.<sup>188</sup> Addressing issues that affect the daily life in civil society help to counter conspiracy theories and hostile tendencies. However, the suitability of DOD to carry out humanitarian assistance is debatable because the military is more focused on quick impact projects versus sustainable development.<sup>189</sup> Also, some non-governmental organizations do not want to directly work with the military, which further creates friction in coordination.<sup>190</sup>

#### **1. Security Sector Reform**

Contemporary thinking holds that donor states should incorporate development or humanitarian programs along with security assistance initiatives. Although this concept

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<sup>187</sup> Nina M. Serafino, *The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress* (CRS Report No. CRL34639) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 1, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34639.pdf>.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

has long been the principle of U.S. foreign policy, it became popularly known as security sector reform (SSR) after Clare Short, a former UK minister for international development stressed it during a public speech in London 1998.<sup>191</sup> SSR hinges on the need to balance effective development of institutions against the security apparatus to safeguard them. It proposed that states should be able to set reasonable limits for security and development imperatives in such a way that the tradeoffs would not reduce effectiveness. SSR therefore covers all U.S. foreign policy initiatives that bear on security and development. Observers have noted that early reforms, especially during the post-independence era in Africa, were primarily focused on modernizing the military without respect to good governance or democratic oversight. Thus, most of the military in the beneficiary countries either perpetuate themselves in power or serve the interests of the donor countries.<sup>192</sup>

SSR sets out to professionalize partner military forces and strengthen civilian oversight. It calls for a holistic approach rather than a single or isolated reform. Herbert Wulf and Michael Brzoska have identified four dimensions for a holistic SSR. These dimensions are political, economic, social, and institutional. The political dimension entails the promotion of good governance, democratic control, accountability, and civil society participation. The economic dimension requires prudent use of resources to balance development and security needs of the state. The social dimension is basically the guarantee of citizens' security, safety, freedom, and wellbeing. The institutional dimension involves professionalizing and defining the roles of various security agencies for accountability and service to the state.<sup>193</sup>

In executing SSR, various factors must be taken into account such as the differences and commonalities between countries, the will of the partner countries to reform, and the situation in the countries. In this regard, Wulf developed a scale to

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<sup>191</sup> Herbert Wulf, "Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries," Berghof Foundation, 2, <http://wulf-herbert.de/Berghofdialogue2.pdf>.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.

<sup>193</sup> Wulf, "Security Sector Reform," 2.

measure the potential for reform in some countries (Table 6). The scale presupposes that post-conflict countries have more potential for reform than countries at war.

Table 6. Scale of Potential for Security Sector Reform.<sup>194</sup>

War	Areas of tension	"failed" states	Societies undergoing conflict mediation	Transformation countries	societies in transition to peace	post-conflict societies
<div> <div>impossible</div> <div> <div></div> <div></div> </div> <div>major potentials</div> </div>						
Sudan	DRC Rwanda Burundi Afghanistan Iraq	Somalia Liberia	Sri Lanka Algeria Chad	Bulgaria Rumania Uzbekistan Turkmenistan Kazakhstan	Bosnia & Herzegovina Kosovo	Mali South Africa

Wulf argues that the priorities in war-prone countries or countries at war diminish the potential for SSR. Furthermore, failed states lack the preconditions and institutions necessary for SSR to take off, while countries undergoing mediation have the opportunity to embrace SSR in so far as it is included in the agreement between parties for the post-conflict phase. For example, the transition executive committee during the Fredrick de Klerk regime in South Africa not only agreed on reforming intelligence but also produced a white paper based on Australian, Canadian, and the British models for reform.

In the case of countries in transformation—for example, the former Soviet-bloc states—incentives and sanctions, as well as external pressure have proven effective.<sup>195</sup> For example, in Romania, incentives to join the European Union accelerated the democratization of intelligence and the military.<sup>196</sup> Countries in transition have the potential to embrace SSR fully once the security forces come to terms with the new

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>195</sup> Keneth R. Dambroski, "Transforming Intelligence in South Africa," in *Reforming Intelligence*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Bora s(Austin,TX: University of Texas Press, 2007).

<sup>196</sup> Florina Cristiana Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community: From and Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 20, no. 4 (2007): 672; Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristiana Matei, "Introduction," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil – Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2012), 9.

paradigm with the help of external donor countries. Similarly, in post-conflict countries, previous peace agreements and external support helped in SSR.

Interestingly, Nigeria was not considered in Wulf's tool. Perhaps the long period of the military regime and the peaceful transition to democracy made the categorization somewhat difficult. However, in terms of transition to democracy and the process of consolidation, Nigeria seems to be on the right path. Therefore, in line with Wulf's tool, the U.S. government's programs in Nigeria are ongoing and have full potential for success.<sup>197</sup>

The U.S. government has been evolving measures to optimize and integrate the efforts of DOS, USAID, and DOD for effective SSR.<sup>198</sup> Similarly, President Obama noted in the U.S. Strategy for SSA: "Strong, accountable, and democratic institutions, sustained by a deep commitment to the rule of law, generate greater prosperity and stability, and meet with greater success in mitigating conflict and ensuring security."<sup>199</sup> Such a declaration shows the United States' commitment to SSR in Africa. The United Nations, NATO, United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations, United Nations Development Program, European Union, UK Department for International Development, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have developed coherent approaches to SSR.<sup>200</sup>

The U.S. government's SSR program places a high priority on the unity of effort among all the agencies responsible for administering aid. It also recognizes the effective coordination with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, multinational partners, and the host nation. For instance, USAID endorsed the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's publication, *Security Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice*, on behalf of U.S. government.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> IHS, "Nigerian Armed Forces."

<sup>198</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Security Sector Reform" (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2009), 1, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115810.pdf>.

<sup>199</sup> U.S. Government, *United States Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, 1.

<sup>200</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Security Sector Reform," 2.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

Furthermore, the U.S. SSR program operates within the framework of six guiding principles, which include supporting host nation ownership, incorporating principles of good governance and respect for human rights, balancing operational support with institutional reforms, linking security and justice, and doing no harm. Essentially, the programs are designed to address the host nation's needs and priorities. The programs must also include oversight mechanisms, training and infrastructure, robust communications systems to foster awareness and transparency, and measures to prevent unintended consequences. Some of the security programs in Nigeria encompass SSR, but no holistic program for SSR like the United States' program in Liberia.<sup>202</sup> Thus, there is no overarching data to harmonize SSR in Nigeria.

## **2. DOD HIV Program**

The U.S. DOD has several HIV programs for the armed forces of partner African nations. The programs include HIV prevention, infrastructural development and support, and treatment and care. The philosophy of the programs is that HIV/AIDS affects military readiness and, by extension, the security and stability of the states. The DOD HIV programs are not duplicates of PEPFAR but are mechanisms to implement the core objective of PEPFAR for the host military and civilian communities. For example, 13 PEPFAR countries have benefited from direct DOD HIV programs tailored to their needs.<sup>203</sup>

The DOD HIV programs include DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, the U.S. Military HIV Research Program, the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, and the Defense Institute of Medical Operations. The DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program is the primary DOD agency for HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care for partner countries. This agency coordinates funding and the DOD agencies that contribute to PEPFAR.

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<sup>202</sup> Mark Malan, "Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings," SSI USAWC, March 14, 2008, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=855>.

<sup>203</sup> U.S. State Department, "The United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief: Department of Defense," DOD, <http://www.pepfar.gov/about/agencies/c19397.htm>.

The U.S Military HIV Research Program is a research-based program dedicated to HIV monitoring, vaccine development, treatment and care. Similarly, the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences program provides health support military operations including policies for HIV testing before and after military deployments. This program also provides psychological counseling for personnel. The Defense Institute of Medical Operations focuses on healthcare management through education and training. The Institute has provided medical capacity development and training for effective HIV policy and prevention to the medical communities in many countries.<sup>204</sup>

In Nigeria, the Walter Reed Program-Nigeria is the main implementer of the DOD PEPFAR program.<sup>205</sup> The Walter Reed program has collaborated with the Nigerian Ministry of Defense in establishing centers of excellence for HIV testing at 20 sites as shown in Figure 12.




Figure 12. PEPFAR Centers of Excellence for HIV Testing.<sup>206</sup>

<sup>204</sup> Ibid.

<sup>205</sup> WRP-N, "Walter Reed Program-Nigeria," WRP-N official website, [http://www.wrp-n.org/?page\\_id=371](http://www.wrp-n.org/?page_id=371).

<sup>206</sup> Darrell Singer, "Building a Partnership through PEPFAR: The Nigerian Ministry of Defence- U.S. Department of Defense HIV Program," Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, April 13, 2010, <http://www.iom.edu/~media/Files/Activity%20Files/Global/LongTermAIDS/2010-APR-12/Singer%20Darrell.ashx>.

The sites have the capacity for diagnosing, caring, and treating from 5 to 50 patients daily. This capacity and facilities have enabled the program to collate up-to-date statistics of HIV cases for care and treatment, as Figure 13 reveals.




Figure 13. Patient Metrics 2006–2009.<sup>207</sup>

The detailed breakdown has helped the Nigerian MOD and the DOD to effectively manage and improve the prevention and care procedures. Similarly, statistics on a national scale have shown that HIV prevalence in Nigeria is decreasing. Thus, the PEPFAR and DOD HIV program could be considered a success. However, the recent outbreak and lethality of Ebola in Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and a few cases in Nigeria suggest that the United States requires a holistic infectious disease capacity building program.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

### **3. Humanitarian Assistance Programs**

The DOD humanitarian assistance programs support the U.S. foreign policy strategic goals and the objectives set in the U.S. Strategy for SSA. The Defense and Security Cooperation Agency manage the humanitarian programs. The programs include humanitarian assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, the excess property program, and the funded transportation program.<sup>208</sup> The objectives include strengthening host nation's capacity to respond to emergencies, cultivating a good relationship between U.S. personnel and the host nation's government and civil society, and countering violent extremism.

The overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid account is the main driver of the program. The activities include the renovation of clinics, schools, and orphanages, and construction/repair of water wells and basic infrastructure.<sup>209</sup> Additionally, humanitarian assistance covers the transfer of non-lethal excess property such as disaster relief material, medical equipment, education supplies, household goods and furniture.<sup>210</sup> Some non-lethal property transfer for fiscal year 2012 is shown in Table 7.

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<sup>208</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Humanitarian Operation," [http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/fy2012\\_ha\\_report\\_to\\_congress\\_submitted.pdf](http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/fy2012_ha_report_to_congress_submitted.pdf).

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Defense and Security Cooperation Agency, *Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2012 Report on Humanitarian Assistance* (Washington, DC: U.S. DSCA, 2013), 4.

Table 7. Non-lethal Property Transfer in 2012.<sup>211</sup>

A	B	C	D
<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>CONTAINER QUANTITY BY TYPE</u>	<u>COMMODITY TYPE</u>	<u>DELIVERED</u>
Nicaragua	2 / 40 FT Sea Vans	School Furniture	3rd Quarter
Nicaragua	5/ 40 FT Sea Van	Household Goods/School Supplies	3rd Quarter
Nicaragua	3/ 40 FT Sea Van	Household Goods/School Supplies	3rd Quarter
Nigeria	2 / 40 FT Sea Van	Medical Supplies and Equipment	3rd Quarter
Nigeria	1 / 40 FT Sea Van	Household Goods/Furniture	4th Quarter
Peru	1 / 40 FT Sea Van	Medical Supplies	1st Quarter
Peru	1 / 20 FT Sea Van	Medical Supplies	4th Quarter
Panama	1 / 40 FT Sea Van	Furniture	4th Quarter
Philippines	2/40 FT Sea Vans	Non-Perishable Food (Dried)	4th Quarter
Romania	1/40 FT Sea Van	Medical Supplies and Equipment	1st Quarter
South Africa	1/ 40 FT Sea Van	Secondary School Books	3rd Quarter
Uganda	1/ 40 FT Sea Van	Medical Supplies	1st Quarter
Uganda	2/ 40 FT Sea Van	Household Goods/Education Supplies	2nd Quarter
Uganda	1/ 40 FT Sea Van	Household Goods/Education Supplies	2nd Quarter

The table shows that Nigeria received medical supplies and equipment in the third quarter and household goods/furniture in the fourth quarter of 2012. The criteria for selecting which country gets which aid and when it gets it is not very clear. Non-lethal property transfers are driven by specific needs of the target country. Additionally, human security assistance programs, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, have a primary criteria based on the World Bank's threshold of countries under the upper-middle income, but not the challenges a country faces.<sup>212</sup> Income level or gross domestic product does not necessarily translate into good quality of life, as is the case in Nigeria.

#### 4. Education and Training Programs

Education and training programs like the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) are designed to educate and train mid-level and senior officers of partner countries in selected U.S. government institutions. The programs are DOS funded, but administered by DOD

<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> Curt Tarnoff, *Millenium Challenge Corporation* (CRS Report No. RL32427) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 3, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32427.pdf>.

through the Defense and Security Cooperation Agency.<sup>213</sup> IMET and CTFP's core objective is to develop requisite knowledge and build a global network of terrorism experts at operational and strategic levels. IMET has two categories—IMET-1 and expanded IMET (E-IMET). The IMET-1 covers professional military education, English language training, and courses in the services' war colleges and other institutions in the United States to enhance interoperability and capacity of partner nations in joint operations. The programs under IMET-1 include national security courses, politico-military policy, and specialized/professional military courses.<sup>214</sup>

E-IMET has been conducted both in institutions across the United States and by mobile teams of experts in host countries. The courses include civil-military relations, human resource management, human rights, and military justice. The value of E-IMET is that its programs allow civilians (either elected officials or representatives of the civil society involved in security matters) to participate in such educational programs, along with the armed forces.<sup>215</sup> The schools handling the training include the Naval Justice School in Newport, Rhode Island, the Center for Civil-Military Relations and Defense Resource Management Institute, and the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California.<sup>216</sup> One overarching goal of the education is for participants to understand the United States' way of life, which has a far-reaching effect.<sup>217</sup> Nevertheless, curricula include global experiences. Table 8 is a breakdown of U.S. foreign military training in Nigeria for fiscal years 2011 and 2012.

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<sup>213</sup> Serafino, *Department of Defence Role in Foreign Assistance*, 52.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>215</sup> In many emerging democracies civilians lack expertise in security issues; such courses have been useful in increasing civilian knowledge in security and defense.

<sup>216</sup> Serafino, *Department of Defence Role in Foreign Assistance*, 52.

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*

Table 8. U.S. Foreign Military Training in Nigeria, 2011–2012.<sup>218</sup>

Program	FY 2011			FY 2012		
	Individual	Course	Dollar	Individual	Course	Dollar
	Students	Count	Value	Students	Count	Value
ALP	1	1	\$33,596	0	0	\$0.00
CTFP	18	13	\$366,083	13	13	\$332,935
FMF	160	19	\$887,940	14	7	\$109,455
FMS	180	51	\$7,243,017	29	42	\$5,064,568
GPOI	4641	20	\$1,623,875	7043	9	\$0.00
IMET-1	31	40	\$1,200,280	25	35	\$655,235
Regional Centers	274	23	\$212,927	6	4	\$0.00
Section 1206	15	1	\$42,692	0	0	\$0.00
<b>Totals:</b>	<b>5320</b>	<b>167**</b>	<b>\$11,610,410</b>	<b>7128*</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>\$6,162,193</b>

The data reveal that during 2011 to 2012, the United States trained about 13,448 students for approximately \$17.7 million. Specifically, CTFP trained 31 students, while IMET trained 56 students from 2011 to 2012. These trainings do not seem to be yielding the desired outcomes in Nigeria because terrorism is increasing. The problem may not be with the training, but with the lack of on-ground capacity to put the training into action. Nigeria lacks surveillance equipment, combat helicopters, and special weapons to track and neutralize terrorists hiding in the ungoverned spaces around its northeastern borders.<sup>219</sup>

#### D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The U.S. strategy for SSA, which enshrines all the developmental and security programs, could be considered an ideal because of its robustness. Although the programs appear to cover the key areas of security in SSA, the reality on the ground in most SSA countries, including Nigeria, does not produce the expected outcomes. Chapter III has

<sup>218</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Foreign Military Training- Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012* (Washington, DC: U.S. DOD, 2012), 11–12, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/197595.pdf>.

<sup>219</sup> IHS, “Nigeria Security.”

revealed how the initiatives like AFRICOM, counterterrorism, and maritime security programs partially address human security problems. For the most part, some barriers, like human rights abuses, have to be addressed before programs are implemented or funds are released. For instance, Nigeria faces the dilemma of human rights abuses against security assistance. There is no standard the for U.S. threshold of human right abuses because in some countries full sanctions are applied, while other countries are merely admonished.

Lack of on-the-ground capability among the security agencies is evident in Nigeria. Without the requisite platforms and materiel to enforce laws or embark on operations against criminality or violent extremism, desired outcomes cannot be realized. For example, a lack of intelligence and surveillance equipment have made it impossible for the Nigerian security agencies to track or rescue the 276 kidnapped schoolgirls since April 2014. Similarly, the RMAC system is only as good as an adequate naval presence to intercept and arrest pirates or other criminals in the Nigerian waters and the GOG at large.

Lack of a coherent strategy and the differences in the mission of the agencies administering aid also affects the outcomes of the programs. For instance, ACOTA is a DOS funded program with huge military activities requiring personnel of the DOD to act as mentors and advisors. Similarly, the TSCTP is a DOS program with overlapping roles of the DOD and USAID. Problems of administering DOD staff under a DOS or USAID coordinator may arise, especially if the program is a DOD-dedicated program.

Inconsistent funding and misconceptions could also be an impediment to the continuity and effectiveness of some programs. Mali is a typical example where a sharp reduction in funding led to the discontinuation of a peace-building project in 2006. In retrospect, the current instability in Mali could be linked to such inconsistencies. Algeria, on the other hand, has not been disposed to TSCTP assistance since 2005. One reason could be the United States' misperception of the problems in Algeria or Algeria's misconception of the United States' intentions. Further, such misperceptions by the United States could be responsible for its treating Boko Haram as mere domestic

terrorists until the situation went out of control with potential threats against U.S. interests.

This chapter also finds that the effectiveness of most of the programs depends on specific not embedded human security programs. Much of the U.S. human security and development assistance is quite selective and ties funding to criteria. For example, the Millenium Challenge Corporation, which is an independent U.S. initiative, focused on human security issues, such as poverty and illiteracy, is open only to lower income or lower-middle-income countries. Important criteria such as the prevalence rates of these problems should be used. Gross domestic product does not necessarily translate to better living or health conditions, as is the case of Nigeria, the largest economy in Africa after the rebasing exercise conducted in April 2014. Consequently, an in-depth analysis of the gaps in U.S. security programs could help develop policy recommendations for better outcomes.

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## **IV. GAPS IN U.S. SECURITY INITIATIVES IN NIGERIA: ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED**

Juxtaposing Nigeria's security challenges examined in Chapter II and U.S. security initiatives as they appear in Chapter III uncovers some gaps that impede progress and the achievement of the desired outcomes. This chapter is comprised of three sections that address the gaps in the security programs and proposes some remedies and recommendations. This chapter also discusses the state security paradigm for solving these problems, also known as the hard-power approach or human security paradigm. This chapter takes up each of these broad problems in turn.

### **A. PROBLEMS BLOCKING PROGRESS OF U.S. SECURITY INITIATIVES**

This section examines the three problems previously uncovered. First, programs may not be addressing the actual problems on the ground. Second, even if the programs address the problems, U.S. bureaucratic bottlenecks—especially interagency coordination, domestic politics, and funding—affect the outcomes. Third, a lack of capacity and capability on the part of the Nigerian security agencies forms a major barrier to the success of the programs.

#### **1. Problem One: Program Mismatch**

The program-problem mismatch stems from the complexity of delineating what U.S. national security imperatives should drive programs and to what extent some tradeoffs can be made. Additionally, religious or cultural differences could lead to misperceptions and misdiagnosis of the problems. Sometimes communal rivalries could also undermine a program because administering humanitarian assistance, such as construction of a well in one local government, might be misunderstood as the United States having a special interest. Furthermore, the dilemma between the regional programs and country specific programs also creates gaps that affect outcomes. In Nigeria, a lack of multinational approaches to the Boko Haram insurgency, as in the case of Mali, has also contributed to poor outcomes.

*a. U.S. Security Interests versus African Security Problems*

One of the problems of the U.S. security initiatives is that they tend to focus more on U.S. security interests than African security problems. As Guy Lamb aptly puts it, “It is highly uncommon for major powers to pursue foreign policy that prioritizes interests and needs of other countries over national interests.”<sup>220</sup> Lamb’s argument resonates in most U.S. foreign policy engagements following World War I. United States’ policy only changed from isolationism to full participation in World War II when Japan challenged its national interests by attacking Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The domino theory, which was the rationale for the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, did not fully strike the balance between U.S. national interests and that of the Vietnamese. The contemporary GWOT only took affect after 9/11 when terrorists directly challenged the United States and had already become more lethal and ideological.

Notably, most nations would do the same, but problems arise when good intentions are characterized by conspiracy and a lack of transparency. For instance, some scholars contend that U.S. AFRICOM is a U.S. ploy to militarize Africa. At the same time, the minimal involvement of the United States in the crisis in the Ivory Coast versus its involvement in Libya seems to support the lack-of-transparency argument. To be fair, one of the justifications for the U.S. action in Libya is to stop Gadhafi from killing his people. Further, AFRICOM is also seen as a U.S. reaction to the growing influence of China in Africa. The African Union was not engaged enough on the formation of AFRICOM until after controversies started cropping up. These narratives breed suspicion of the United States’ real intentions. Reconciling where to draw the line between U.S. national security priorities and foreign policy objectives is a major area of divergence.

As much as the United States seeks to protect its national interest first, it should not do so to the detriment of the goodwill enshrined in its foreign policy objectives. Some objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Africa include the promotion of good governance and the provision of humanitarian assistance against poverty, hunger, and diseases. Nigeria, as well as other African countries, desires such assistance. Nonetheless, the criteria

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<sup>220</sup> Lamb, “Parading U.S. Security Interests as African Security Policy,” 50.

required for countries to get the aid make it almost impossible to achieve. Such conditions create more lacunae between programs and problems.

Most policymakers and scholars agree on the significance of Nigeria as Robert P. Jackson, the principal deputy assistant secretary, Africa Bureau, notes:<sup>221</sup>

A peaceful and stable Nigeria is crucially important to the future of Africa, and we cannot stay on the sidelines if it stumbles. Nigeria has the continent's largest population and biggest economy. We look to Nigeria as a partner in our quest to help Africans lead lives free of violence and filled with possibility. As an engine of growth, a fountainhead of art and industry, and a political giant, Nigeria is vital to the success of President Obama's 2012 Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. As we implement that strategy, we are focusing on building a democratic, prosperous, and secure Nigeria.

Yet Nigeria's security environment complicates this vision. As the United States world threat report of March 13, 2013 revealed that "African stability would be threatened not only by ... extremist attacks in Nigeria, but also by the collapse of governance in northern Mali and renewed conflict in the Great Lakes region."<sup>222</sup> This argument was corroborated by a Nigerian scholar, Daniel Agbibo when he noted that "the group's (Boko Haram's) active gnawing at the religious, ethnic, and regional fault-lines of Nigeria not only threatens the country's peace and unity, but holds serious transnational implications."<sup>223</sup> Similarly, despite the UN's deployment of the action of African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and now the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and international support from France and the United States, extremism in northern Mali still threatens the country's stability.

Nigeria did not receive the support Mali got from the United Nations and the United States. The current situation in Nigeria typifies the primacy of U.S. national

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<sup>221</sup> Robert P. Jackson, "#Bringbackourgirls: Addressing the Growing Threat of Boko Haram," DOS, May 15, 2014, 2, [http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jackson\\_Testimony1.pdf](http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jackson_Testimony1.pdf).

<sup>222</sup> James R. Clapper, "World Intelligence Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community," March 12, 2013, 19, <http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence>.

<sup>223</sup> Daniel Agbibo, "The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria: Boko Haram Versus the State," *International Journal of Stability and Security Development* 2, no. 3 (2013): 1.

security over Nigeria’s security problems. For example, despite the ongoing debate about the need to support Nigeria against Boko Haram, the United States stopped Israel from the supplying American-made Chinook helicopters in September 2014.<sup>224</sup> Furthermore, GAO’s combating terrorism report, Figure 14, begs many questions about the level of U.S. assistance to combat Boko Haram.




Figure 14. Selected Terrorist Incidents in Northwest Africa, 2009–2014.<sup>225</sup>

The timeline shows that the lethality and frequency of Boko Haram attacks far outweighs that of Mauritania al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its affiliates. The report does not include the kidnapping of the schoolgirls or the beheading of a Nigerian Air force pilot.<sup>226</sup> The world witnessed the swift U.S. reaction against ISIS, including a proposal to arm such controversial militant groups as the Islamic Front.<sup>227</sup> Weapons were even air dropped to support the campaign against ISIS.<sup>228</sup> If Boko Haram had carried out the decapitations of foreign nationals, perhaps the response would have been different.

<sup>224</sup> ThisDay, “U.S Blocks Nigeria’s Purchase of Chinook Helicopters from Israel,” September 23, 2014, <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/us-blocks-nigeria-s-purchase-of-chinook-helicopters-from-israel/189710/>.

<sup>225</sup> Pendleton, *Combating Terrorism*, 7.

<sup>226</sup> The beheaded Nigerian Air Force Pilot, Wing Commander Chimda Hedima, is not just a colleague, but also a personal friend. He was my roommate for a few months at the 2011–2012 Defense Services Command and Staff College course, Bangladesh. He is a complete gentleman officer and he remains my hero.

<sup>227</sup> Ernesto Londono and Greg Miller, “CIA Begins Weapons Delivery to Syrian Rebels,” September 11, 2013, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-begins-weapons-delivery-to-syrian-rebels/2013/09/11/9fcf2ed8-1b0c-11e3-a628-7e6dde8f889d\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-begins-weapons-delivery-to-syrian-rebels/2013/09/11/9fcf2ed8-1b0c-11e3-a628-7e6dde8f889d_story.html).

<sup>228</sup> Ibid.

Until recently, the main U.S. strategic interest has been to neutralize Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, with little emphasis on groups outside this category. If U.S. policymakers had requested through, for example, Congressional Research Service reports, GAO reports, and congressional hearings, information on Boko Haram earlier, the security problems of Nigeria might not have escalated to this level. The reports would have made appropriate recommendations on countering Boko Haram such as a multinational approach, more robust intelligence, and more weapons delivery to the Nigerian security agencies.

Admittedly, Nigerian security agencies are partly responsible for the aggravated security situation. Repressive tactics used for earlier extremists like the Miatatsine sect and the Niger Delta Militants further provoked Boko Haram violence. Some scholars contend that only transparency will help identify common grounds that will meet the aspirations of U.S. national interests and those of partner nations.<sup>229</sup> Thus, while U.S. interests come first, fully engaging partner countries in identifying the immediate issues that need to be addressed would be more strategic for the United States.

***b. Misperception or Misdiagnosis?***

Misconception and misdiagnosis of the security problems is also a major drawback in the one-size-fits-all approach. For example, some Nigerian officials perceive U.S. assistance as meddling with its internal affairs, while the United States is more concerned about rule of law and good governance.<sup>230</sup> Additionally, while specific instances in Nigeria have not been identified, Algeria's refusal to be part of the TSCTP and its open denouncement of AFRICOM stemmed from the misperception of the United States' intention and its preference for bilateral engagements.<sup>231</sup>

Misdiagnosis is more evident in the DOD humanitarian assistance programs. A regional assistance model may not adequately address a national problem. The DOD's

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<sup>229</sup> Jessica Piombo, "U.S. Africa Policy: Rhetoric Versus Reality," *Current History* 111, no. 745 (2012): 79.

<sup>230</sup> Ploch, *Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, 19.

<sup>231</sup> Alexis Arieff, *Algeria: Current Issues* (CRS Report No. RS21532) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), I, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21532.pdf>.

humanitarian assistance in Djibouti during Ramadan in 2009 almost led to an unintended consequence as some of the clothing distributed offended the Muslims.<sup>232</sup> In Nigeria, PEPFAR did not initially cater to malaria and tuberculosis, which kills more Nigerians. PEPFAR had to be expanded to cover the Presidential Malaria Initiative.<sup>233</sup> If the U.S. agencies had worked closely with Nigeria health officials and not just reacted to the global outcry regarding HIV, the initiative would have covered malaria and tuberculosis from the onset.

*c. Regional versus Country Programming*

Prioritizing regional over national programs creates a stumbling block for U.S. programs. The regional approach fosters cooperation and integration toward addressing common security challenges, but it all depends of the geopolitical situation of the region. In North Africa, for example, Morocco was not active with the TSCTP because of the U.S. engagement with Algeria.<sup>234</sup> Morocco is not happy with Algeria's support to the Polisario Front, a militant group in dispute with Morocco over Western Sahara.<sup>235</sup> In West Africa, however, the situation is different because apart from internal skirmishes, most countries live in harmony with their neighbors. Notably, Nigeria and Cameroon have resolved their territorial dispute over the Bakassi peninsula.<sup>236</sup> Thus, regional initiatives will have less friction in West Africa than in North Africa.

Nonetheless, the regional approach tends to subsume pressing security challenges at the national level. For instance, since conceptualization, TSCTP was a regional initiative so less impetus was given to national problems. At the regional level, delegates or participants from a particular country cannot fully address their issues at the expense

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<sup>232</sup> Pendleton, *Interagency Collaboration Practices*, 16.

<sup>233</sup> Ploch, *Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, 20.

<sup>234</sup> Vish Sakthivel, "Kerry's Visit to Morocco and Algeria: Navigating between Competitors," The Washington Institute, November 4, 2013, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/kerrys-visit-to-morocco-and-algeria-navigating-between-competitors>.

<sup>235</sup> Alexis Arieff, *Morocco: Current Issues* (CRS Report No. RS21579) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 12, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21579.pdf>.

<sup>236</sup> United Nations, "Nigeria, Cameroon Sign Agreement Ending Decades-Old Border Dispute; Sets Procedures for Nigerian Withdrawal from Bakassi Peninsula," June 12, 2006, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/afr1397.doc.htm>.

of other participants. The initial focus of the TSTCP on the Sahel region has had negative consequences on a strategic partner like Nigeria.

Similarly, the regional maritime security programs do not address a specific country scenario, such as oil theft in the Niger Delta. Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS is more focused on transnational maritime crimes in the GOG. Notably, the pirates do not live on the high seas because they are the same criminals that engage in local crimes. Thus, Nigeria needs specific programs to build capacities against local crimes. Such a capability would deny the criminals freedom of action both in Nigerian and international waters.

**d. *Lack of a Multinational Approach to Combat Boko Haram Terrorism***

A lack of multinational efforts against Boko Haram has also contributed to why some of the U.S. programs have not produced the desired outcomes. The main problem has been whether the U.S. government should designate Boko Haram as an foreign terrorist organization. For instance, Nigerian experts cautioned the United States against being perceived as supporting the Christian cause while the United States was concerned about the heavy-handedness of Nigerian security agencies.<sup>237</sup> These arguments left the bulk of the counterterrorism response to Nigeria alone.

It was not until several kidnappings of expatriate workers and the 2011 bombing of the UN building in Abuja that the United States called for the first congressional hearing on Boko Haram.<sup>238</sup> Furthermore, Boko Haram espouses a Jihadi ideology, which transcends Nigeria's borders.<sup>239</sup> Boko Haram also emulates ISIS and its horrible acts of beheading captives.<sup>240</sup> Using the media for propaganda and countering any government's success shows how technologically literate some of its members are.

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<sup>237</sup> Ploch, *Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, 14.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>239</sup> Simonelli, "Boko Haram."

<sup>240</sup> Stephanie Linning, "Boko Haram Releases Video Showing Beheading of Nigerian Air Force Pilot as Terror Leader," *Daily Mail*, October 3, 2014, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2780169/Boko-Haram-releases-video-showing-beheading-Nigerian-Air-Force-pilot-terror-leader-declares-Even-kill-not-stop-imposing-Islamic-rule.html>.

The question is why the United States and other countries waited for a singular event that sparked international condemnation to open a more structured discussion and offer assistance. Even with increased surveillance and U.S. advisers over the past six months, the schoolgirls have not been found. Instead more schools are being attacked and students kidnapped. If such measures had been exercised before the fall of Ghadafi, Boko Haram probably would not have acquired the weapons it has today. Additionally, the U.S. focus on Mauritania al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its affiliates gave Boko Haram more time to recruit and strategize. Further, if the current cooperation between regional countries, especially those bordering Nigeria, had been in place, perhaps the situation would have been better.

*e. Disconnect between Training and Implementation*

The gaps between training and implementation affect the outcomes of the U.S. security initiative. Statistics mostly reveal the number of personnel trained, but not how effective are these personnel, or where they were deployed after the training?<sup>241</sup> Additionally, the mobile training teams who conduct the CTFP and IMET programs do not choose the students they get for the training. An overriding criterion is the minimum number of students required for the course to be held and administrative vetting on whether any participant or his regiment is involved in human rights abuses.<sup>242</sup> Students who do not pass the vetting are replaced. Nonetheless, the replaced student may simply be cleared, yet lack the requisite qualifications for the course.

The Office of Defense Cooperation cannot completely determine the type of training program nominees have received. To be fair, the high level of scrutiny based on U.S. standards can hardly be met; however, the United States needs to develop a practical method of evaluating the efficacy of the training. In Nigeria for instance, how does the United States determine the number of students trained for the TSCTP actually deployed in counterterrorism related roles? How are the maritime security programs implemented? Do the U.S. programs include a plan to monitor progress before fully disengaging? What

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<sup>241</sup> Pendleton, *Actions Needed*, 4.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid.

should be the threshold for the U.S. disengagement? Such questions ought to guide how programs are administered.

## **2. Problem Two: U.S. Bureaucratic Bottlenecks**

U.S. bureaucratic bottlenecks can manifest from political party agendas in Washington and different cultures/missions of agencies administering aid. Further, the public opinion in the United States may either enhance or aggravate the problem. This section considers interagency coordination, inconsistent funding, and human rights issues as they impinge on program delivery.

The multi-agency and multifaceted approach to the U.S. administration of aid or security programs creates coordination problems. Different agencies have different missions and cultures. For example, the Treasury Department handles multilateral aid; USAID handles bilateral assistance, while DOS and DOD are responsible for military and security related programs.<sup>243</sup> Some overlaps could have dire consequences such as fragmentation, inefficiency, and incoherence.

Further, the problems may affect how the U.S. agencies coordinate with other donors in a particular country.<sup>244</sup> For instance, during a donor coordination meeting in South Africa, two representatives of the U.S. agencies had never met prior to the meeting.<sup>245</sup> Also, DOD personnel may not want to report to the USAID representative on the ground. Although there have been no reported cases in Nigeria, one of the major areas of conflict is when the DOD carries out humanitarian assistance, which is the purview of DOS or USAID.

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<sup>243</sup> Curt Tarnoff, *Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy* (CRS Report No.R40213) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004), I, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/157097.pdf>.

<sup>244</sup> Marian Leonardo Lawson, *Foreign Aid: International Donor Coordination of Development Assistance* (CRS Report No.R41185) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 19, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41185.pdf>.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid.

### **3. Inconsistent Funding**

Fluctuation in the funding of most U.S. programs hinders the attainment of some important objectives of U.S. security programs. The sharp reduction in funding to Mali in 2006 halted a peace-building project in the northern part of the country.<sup>246</sup> In hindsight, the situation in Mali today could be partly attributed to the discontinuity of such projects. Similarly, the funds Nigeria received under the TSCTP program is not commensurate with the scope and dynamics of combatting Boko Haram. It is important for policymakers in the United States to develop threat-based criteria for the distribution of funds for a particular program.

### **4. Human Rights Issues versus the Severity of the Problem**

Respect for human rights resonates as an important condition to qualify for U.S. developmental and security assistance. Human rights vetting or the Leahy law, the brainchild of Senator Patrick Leahy, prevents the United States from giving assistance to a country if there is credible evidence that individuals or units have committed human rights abuses with impunity.<sup>247</sup> The United States not only sees the Leahy law as a moral obligation, but also a core national interest.<sup>248</sup> However, what is the tradeoff between a grave security situation and human rights abuses? According to Congressman Chris Smith, “Laws our congress created to prevent our alliances with rogue military and security forces are being blamed for making our assistance difficult.”<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>246</sup> Pendleton, “Actions Needed,” 26.

<sup>247</sup> Nina M. Serafino et al., “*Leahy Law*,” *Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview* (CRS Report No. R43361) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 1, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43361.pdf>.

<sup>248</sup> Elisa Massimino, “Testimony of Elisa Massimino on ‘Human Rights Vetting: Nigeria and Beyond’ Congressional Hearing,” July 10, 2014, <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/testimony-elisa-massimino-human-rights-vetting-nigeria-and-beyond-congressional-hearing>.

<sup>249</sup> Christopher H. Smith, *Human Rights Vetting: Nigeria and Beyond* (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, 2014), 1, <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2014/7/31/extensions-of-remarks-section/article/E1290-1>.

Nigerian security agencies have been accused of extra-judicial killings and brutality against suspected extremists and Boko Haram.<sup>250</sup> These abuses were committed by only a small percentage of Nigerian security agencies. As of 2012, about 187 military units and 173 police units have been vetted, and yet few have been trained or equipped to combat terrorism.<sup>251</sup> The provision of the Leahy law allows for cleared units or those that have been renamed or replaced to be assisted. For example, the United States supported a country without much scrutiny after serious human right abuses had been committed. In Columbia, about 500 units committed over 3,000 extrajudicial executions, yet only a few were sanctioned, and U.S. assistance returned.<sup>252</sup> So why is the Nigerian case either over politicized or different?

The United States is still not disposed to provide weapons to the Nigerian military.<sup>253</sup> Situations like these are counter-productive especially when a country shows evidence of compliance, and the security problem created by Boko Haram is severe. Nigeria suffered the same fate during the Biafran war, when the United State refused to approve the sale of 106mm ammunition. Unfortunately, the end result will be a military ill-equipped to fight terrorism. Strategic partners like Nigeria should be treated more strategically: a balance between carrots and sticks.

## **5. Problem Three: Incapacity of the Nigerian Security Agencies**

The Nigerian security agencies are not operating at an optimum state. Additionally, the size of the military has shrunk by about 50 percent in the last three decades. While many years of military rule could be attributed to the poor operational state, the same cannot be said for the declining personnel numbers. Thus, dwindling

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<sup>250</sup> Lauren Ploch, *Hearing: Human Rights Vetting: Nigeria and Beyond* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 6, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20140710/102447/HHRG-113-FA16-Wstate-BlanchardL-20140710.pdf>.

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>252</sup> FOR, *Report: Military Assistance and Human Rights: Colombia, U.S. Accountability, and Global Implications* (New York: Fellowship of Reconciliation, 2010), iii, <http://forusa.org/sites/default/files/uploads/militaryaid100729web.pdf>.

<sup>253</sup> ThisDay, "U.S. Blocks Nigeria's Purchase of Chinook Helicopters from Israel."

intelligence capability and the operational state of the Nigerian security agencies help to identify why these gaps affect the outcomes of U.S. security initiatives.

**a. *Weak CT Capability and Technical Intelligence Architecture***

Traditionally, most of the security agencies fighting terrorism were not established for that purpose. So the formation of inter-agency taskforces without the requisite training in CT has been responsible for the huge gaps in CT operations. For example, the joint task force for Operation Restore Hope in the Niger Delta established in 2003 comprises intelligence detachments from the main security agencies.<sup>254</sup> Nonetheless, a lack of technical intelligence apparatus such as cryptographic and surveillance equipment affected the success of the operation.<sup>255</sup> The situation seems to be the same with the current joint task force for Operation Restore Order established against Boko Haram in 2011.

The agencies lack core capabilities such as counterinsurgency training, robust intelligence equipment; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives countermeasures equipment, among others.<sup>256</sup> For instance, a cult group in Nasarawa States of Nigeria disarmed and slaughtered 30 members of the Nigerian police in 2013.<sup>257</sup> If the Nigerian police had counterinsurgency skills, the approach or tactics against the cult group would have saved more lives.

Additionally, a lack of robust intelligence capabilities in Nigeria may have been responsible for poor outcomes from increased U.S. intelligence assistance since April 2014.<sup>258</sup> These incidents, along with several others, re-enforce the need to provide the

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<sup>254</sup> Ngboawaji Daniel Nte, "An Analysis of Intelligence Support to Security Operations in Nigeria: A Review of Some Joint Task Force Operations," *Peace and Security Review* 5, no. 9 (2013): 4.

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>256</sup> Department of Homeland Security, "Target Capabilities List: A Companion to National Preparedness and Guidelines," September 2007, 115, <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/training/tcl.pdf>.

<sup>257</sup> BBC, "Nigeria Attack: Nasarawa Cult Ambush 'Kills 30 Police'," BBC, May 9, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22462225>.

<sup>258</sup> IHS, "Nigerian Armed Forces."

security agencies with necessary CT capabilities. It will help streamline deployments, reduce unnecessary casualties, and prevent inter-agency conflicts.

A first step is the introduction of a CT curriculum in the security institutions or development of a standard CT intelligence architecture. Another option is to develop intelligence and surveillance capability including a limited drone fleet. Such a fleet would provide the much needed real-time intelligence of insurgents for timely decision making. Aside from the legal implications of using drones across international boundaries, current GWOT in Pakistan, Yemen, and Syria proves the effectiveness of drones against terrorists.

***b. Operational State of the Nigerian Armed Forces***

The operational state of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) is also responsible for unpredictable outcomes in U.S. security operations. The Nigerian armed forces' major problem today is not professionalism, but inadequate or obsolete equipment to execute operations.<sup>259</sup> Additionally, the strength of the armed forces is small compared to the size of the population. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute database, the personnel strength of the AFN decreased from 134,000 in 1985 to 79,000 in 2003.<sup>260</sup> Nigeria's military personnel and defense expenditure is compared with that of other African countries as shown in Table 9.

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<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

<sup>260</sup> SIPRI, "Armed Forces, Weapons Holdings and Employment in Arms Production: Nigeria," SIPRI, <http://first.sipri.org/search?country=NGA&dataset=armed-forces>.

Table 9. Comparison of Military Personnel and Defense Expenditure.<sup>261</sup>

	Defence Spending current US\$ m			Defence Spending per capita (current US\$)			Defence Spending % of GDP			Number in Armed Forces (000)	Estimated Reservists (000)	Paramilitary (000)
	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013	2014	2014	2014
Côte d'Ivoire	587	635	751	27	29	34	2.44	2.61	2.65	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.
Democratic Republic of the Congo	221	232	416	3	3	6	1.41	1.31	2.15	134	0	0
Djibouti*	10	n.k.	n.k.	13	n.k.	n.k.	0.78	n.k.	n.k.	10	0	3
Equatorial Guinea*	8	n.k.	n.k.	12	n.k.	n.k.	0.04	n.k.	n.k.	1	0	0
Eritrea*	78	n.k.	n.k.	13	n.k.	n.k.	2.99	n.k.	n.k.	202	120	0
Ethiopia	273	254	351	3	3	4	0.86	0.61	0.76	138	0	0
Gabon	266	222	263	169	138	161	1.67	1.32	1.36	5	0	2
Gambia*	6	n.k.	n.k.	4	n.k.	n.k.	0.66	n.k.	n.k.	1	0	0
Ghana	128	111	291	5	5	12	0.33	0.28	0.68	16	0	0
Guinea*	42	n.k.	n.k.	4	n.k.	n.k.	0.81	n.k.	n.k.	10	0	3
Guinea-Bissau	20	26	n.k.	13	16	n.k.	2.08	2.89	n.k.	4	0	2
Kenya	629	930	975	15	22	22	1.85	2.22	2.10	24	0	5
Lesotho	50	55	54	26	29	28	2.00	2.12	2.06	2	0	0
Liberia	13	n.k.	n.k.	3	n.k.	n.k.	0.82	n.k.	n.k.	2	0	0
Madagascar	72	69	72	3	3	3	0.73	0.69	0.67	14	0	8
Malawi	43	32	25	3	2	2	0.76	0.71	0.67	5	0	2
Mali	226	213	301	15	14	19	2.13	2.22	2.64	3	0	5
Mauritius	62	71	83	47	54	63	0.55	0.60	0.69	0	0	3
Mozambique	70	n.k.	75	3	n.k.	3	0.55	n.k.	0.47	11	0	0
Namibia	460	381	458	214	176	210	3.67	3.14	3.56	9	0	6
Niger	63	70	n.k.	4	4	n.k.	1.04	1.07	n.k.	5	0	5
Nigeria	2,249	2,033	2,143	14	12	12	0.92	0.75	0.76	80	0	82
Rwanda	74	76	82	6	6	7	1.16	1.09	1.06	33	0	2
Senegal	253	189	231	20	15	17	1.75	1.35	1.61	14	0	5
Seychelles	n.a.	10	12	n.k.	110	127	n.k.	1.02	1.02	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	13	14	14	2	2	3	0.44	0.35	0.31	11	0	0
Somalia	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	20	0	0
South Africa	5,290	5,069	4,848	108	104	100	1.29	1.30	1.29	62	15	0
South Sudan	533	819	714	53	77	64	3.05	7.16	5.27	210	0	0
Sudan	1,163	n.k.	1,516	35	n.k.	43	1.82	n.k.	3.00	244	0	20

The table shows that as of 2014, the number of personnel in the AFN is about 80,000 and the defense spending is 0.76 percent of GDP in 2013. In comparison, South Africa has 62,000 personnel with a defense expenditure of about 1.29 percent of the GDP. The strength of the armed forces when compared to the population of both countries depicted in Figure 15 speaks volumes about Nigeria's defense and security priorities.

<sup>261</sup> The Military Balance, "Chapter Ten: Country Comparisons : Commitments, Force Levels and Economics Routledge," February 5, 2014, 491, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2014.871887>.



Figure 15. Country Comparison between Nigeria and South Africa.<sup>262</sup>

Nigeria has a population of about 174 million people; South Africa has a population of about 53 million people. The population ratio is 3:1, yet the armed forces personnel ratio is 1.3:1, which means that there are more soldiers in South Africa per criminal than in Nigeria. This statistic explains why the AFN cannot fully dominate and contain the Boko Haram in the northeast. Notably, the Pakistan Army deployed more than 70,000 regular troops against the Taliban in the Pakistani North West Frontier Province.<sup>263</sup>

In terms of hardware, the AFN lacks adequate operational and logistic equipment for operations. Figure 16 shows the equipment holdings of the AFN, but does not include their operational state.

<sup>262</sup> Countryeconomy.com, "Country Comparison South Africa vs. Nigeria," <http://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/south-africa/nigeria>.

<sup>263</sup> David Khattak, "Evaluating Pakistan's Offensives in Swat and F.A.T.A.," October 31, 2011, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/evaluating-pakistan's-offensives-in-swat-and-fata>.




Figure 16. Nigerian Armed Forces Inventory.<sup>264</sup>

Figure 16 shows that the Nigerian Army inventory is mostly made up of armored vehicles and artillery pieces, which are not suitable for low intensity operations of counterinsurgency.

The Nigerian Navy also has few platforms to carry out constant patrols against piracy and criminal activities at sea. In the case of the Nigerian Air Force, attack helicopters and ground attack aircraft necessary for giving close air support for land forces are grossly inadequate. How can the AFN combat terrorism and still meet its peacekeeping obligations at the regional and global levels with limited equipment

<sup>264</sup> IHS, "Nigerian Armed Forces."

holdings? To stem these problems, issues like reorganizing the armed forces and developing a comprehensive CT strategy easily come to mind.

## **B. ADDRESSING THE SYMPTOMS: STATE SECURITY PARADIGM**

In addressing the symptoms of the security challenges examined in this thesis, the Nigerian government has repositioned its security agencies to better carry out their roles. The United States also has some role to play because the solutions will translate to better outcomes for U.S. security initiatives. The solutions include establishing a counterterrorism center of excellence, upgrading intelligence and CT capabilities, establishing a multinational task force against Boko Haram, and developing a national counterinsurgency strategy.

### **1. Establish a Central Coordinating Agency: Center of Excellence**

Establishment of a central coordinating agency for combating terrorism and violent extremism is necessary for effective management and deployment of resources. For instance, after 9/11, the U.S government realized that coordination of security agencies was a major challenge, and it took deliberate measures to address it.<sup>265</sup> The U.S. government has developed many programs and policies for improving coordination and connecting the dots. The office of the Director of National Intelligence was created to synergize the activities of all the intelligence agencies.<sup>266</sup> The National Counterterrorism Center was established to enhance the capacity of the office of the Director of National Intelligence.<sup>267</sup> Additionally, Presidential Policy Directives have streamlined inter-agency coordination for effective homeland security.

Although Nigeria has established a counterterrorism center, it is not an autonomous agency; it is under the office of the national security adviser.<sup>268</sup> Such an

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<sup>265</sup> Donald F. Kettl, *System under Stress: Challenges of 21st Century Governance*, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles, CA: CQ Press, 2013), 40.

<sup>266</sup> Marshall Curtis Erwin, *Intelligence Issues for the Congress* (CRS Report No. RL33539) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 1, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33539.pdf>.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>268</sup> Mohammed Sambo Dasuki, "Nigeria's Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism-1," *Leadership*, March 19, 2014, <http://leadership.ng/features/356955/nigerias-soft-approach-countering-terrorism-1>.

arrangement would not effectively address issues of coordination and the effective management of intelligence. Nigeria needs to solicit the support and expertise of the United States on the CT center. If a proper CT center had been established, the overarching capabilities required for Nigerian security agencies to integrate with U.S. military advisers would have been in place. The center could also serve as a regional center for combating terrorism. Further, U.S. mobile training teams and the U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation in Nigeria could easily monitor program implementation and measure effectiveness.

## **2. Upgrade and Integrate Technical Intelligence and Surveillance Capability with a Limited Drone Fleet**

Proactive intelligence is essential to an effective response to terrorism. Richard English stresses, “Without high quality intelligence ... all aspects of state response will stumble ineffectively.”<sup>269</sup> For example, intelligence played a major part in the Irish Republican Army’s stalemate leading to a peace process with the British government. Conversely, poor intelligence could have grave consequences; intelligence failures questioned the U.S. legitimacy and credibility in Iraq.<sup>270</sup> A human intelligence network played a key role in the neutralization of Hamas leaders.

Technical intelligence, drone surveillance, and combat drone surveillance have immensely assisted U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The ongoing U.S. air support for land operations against ISIS exemplifies the importance of technical intelligence. One of the core capabilities lacking in Nigeria is technical intelligence with a limited drone fleet. Such a capability will not only enhance force protection, it will also improve the effectiveness of the AFN. The beheading of Wing Commander Chimda Hedima would have been avoided if drones had been used for the operations. Thus, if there had been initial intelligence data on the approximate location of Boko Haram, the U.S. intelligence assistance would have yielded better results.

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<sup>269</sup> Richard English, *Terrorism: How to Respond* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 132.

<sup>270</sup> Ibid.

### **3. Establish a Multinational Task Force against Nigeria's Transnational Terrorists**

A key component in combating terrorism is partnership at regional and international levels. The current U.S. designation of Boko Haram as a foreign terrorist organization and UN sanctions against the group have set the stage for a multinational action. The effort by the United States and some European countries, such as the UK and France, to assist Nigeria is a step in the right direction. Further, the conference held in France called on neighboring African states to cooperate against cross-border terrorism. The hot spots for terrorists are the border areas between Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

Regional partnerships between the security agencies of the neighboring countries have started to yield results. For instance, Cameroonian Special Forces have attacked and killed several members of Boko Haram.<sup>271</sup> Similarly, Chad is actively involved in forging a deal with Boko Haram to release the kidnapped schoolgirls.<sup>272</sup> These efforts are effective, but not coordinated. It is therefore necessary for the ministries of defense of the neighboring countries to explore the formation of a multinational task force to combat Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in the region. The task force should not be limited to the countries neighboring Nigeria. Such a task force would be a litmus test for the efficacy of the future African Standby Force.

### **4. Develop a Comprehensive Counterinsurgency Strategy for Nigeria**

Developing a national counterinsurgency strategy would be a viable step towards combating terrorism and other threats to Nigeria. The strategy should describe the government and civil society responsibilities for civil defense, emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border control, and immigration.<sup>273</sup> Nigeria's current

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<sup>271</sup> David Lewis, "Cameroon Security Forces Kill 2 Boko Haram Militants after Raid," Reuters, June 8, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/08/us-cameroon-boko-haram-idUSKBN0EJ0E720140608>.

<sup>272</sup> Michael Ireland, "Nigerian Government and Boko Haram Terrorists 'Agree to Ceasefire and Schoolgirls' Release'," Assist News Service, October 17, 2014, <http://www.assistnews.net/ansarticle.asp?URL=Stories/2014/s14100211.htm>.

<sup>273</sup> Department of Homeland Security, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland*, February 2010, v, [https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr\\_report.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf).

counterterrorism strategy focuses more on addressing the symptoms and does not cater to a broader counterinsurgency doctrine.<sup>274</sup>

The national strategy should adopt the best practices for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, such as adapting to it, addressing the underlying causes; avoiding over militarization, using robust intelligence; respecting orthodox legal frameworks, adhering to established rule of law; and maintaining citizens' trust and credibility.<sup>275</sup> For the strategy to be effective, it will require the creation of separate agency for the director of national intelligence. The agency and the CT center should be autonomous. As a first step, a committee could be set up drawing members from all the security agencies to develop the strategy. Once developed, the security agencies would be better focused in their respective CT and counterinsurgency operations.

### **C. ADDRESSING THE UNDERLYING CAUSES: HUMANITARIAN SECURITY PARADIGM**

Human security solutions for the insecurity in Nigeria are numerous and require time to achieve. Nonetheless, some of the immediate remedies that would translate into better outcomes for the U.S. security initiatives include education sector reforms, justice sector reforms, poverty eradication programs, and the prioritization of U.S. humanitarian assistance programs.

#### **1. Education Sector Reforms**

The low literacy rate among the youth of ages 15 to 25 in Nigeria calls for a pragmatic education sector reform. This has become more necessary because demographics reveal that northeastern Nigeria, ground zero of Boko Haram operations, suffers from the highest level of illiteracy among youth. Illiterate youths are more susceptible to extremist brainwashing than youths who can question the rationale for joining any organization. Nigeria has over the years embarked on several programs to revamp the education sector. Some of the programs include the Universal Basic

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<sup>274</sup> Aminu Mohammed Umar, "Nigeria and the Boko Haram Sect: Adopting a Better Strategy for Resolving the Crisis" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 46–52.

<sup>275</sup> English, *Terrorism: How to Respond*, 146.

Education program, the Education Trust Fund, and the Petroleum Technology Development Fund.<sup>276</sup>

The overall objectives of these programs bolster all levels of education in Nigeria.<sup>277</sup> The Petroleum Technology Development Fund has a larger budget and is more focused on tertiary education to build capacities needed in the technology and petroleum industry.<sup>278</sup> While tertiary education is desirable, the focus should be in striking a balance between the collapsing basic education system and spending millions of dollar abroad. If the basic education systems are not overhauled, no competent students can fill the technology drive of the Petroleum Technology Development Fund. Additionally, illiterate radicalized youth will continue to fuel violence and instability in Nigeria.

The main cause of extremism in northern Nigeria is the proliferation of unregulated Koranic schools. Radical clerics at such schools easily radicalize their students. The Boko Haram sect has been known to use a private mosque, which has a Koranic school to recruit its members.<sup>279</sup> As part of the education sector reform, the Nigerian government needs to take deliberate steps to reorganize and integrate the Koranic schools into the formal education system. Recently, the Kano state government integrated most of its Koranic schools with the primary education system and provided free tuition, uniforms, breakfast, and lunch.<sup>280</sup> The strategy has produced positive results as other Koranic schools have requested to be integrated.<sup>281</sup> Thus, the Kano model could be applied to most of the northern state to encourage students to go to school without sacrificing their religious obligations. The model will also help in managing and

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<sup>276</sup> C. A. Ajibola and L. U. Akah L. O. Ogunjimi, "Sustenance of Education Sector Reforms in Nigeria through Adequate Participation by All Stake Holders," *International NGO* 4, no. 4 (2009): 105.

<sup>277</sup> Ibid.

<sup>278</sup> PTDF, "Overseas Scholarship Scheme (OSS)," PTDF, <http://www.ptdf.gov.ng/index.php/scholarships/overseas>.

<sup>279</sup> Walker, "What Is Boko Haram," 3–4.

<sup>280</sup> Will Ross, "Nigeria Schools Walk Line between Islamic and Western Traditions," BBC, June 1, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27658382>.

<sup>281</sup> Ibid.

monitoring clerics with an extremist ideology. Salary incentives could also be offered to the clerics to encourage them.

## **2. Justice Sector Reforms**

The reformation of the justice sector to one that is more effective and accountable to all Nigerians will help address insecurity in Nigeria. An impartial justice system and rule of law is the foundation for any society or organization. It prevents chaos, anarchy, and crisis and regulates the daily activities of the citizenry. Additionally, it fosters respect for human rights.<sup>282</sup> In Nigeria, the masses have lost faith in the justice system because the security agencies operate with impunity. The growth of militia across Nigeria suggests that the police cannot provide protection to the people. Extremist groups easily recruit militias.

Another manifestation of the weak justice system is the Sharia law controversy among northern Nigerian states, which has been politicized and misunderstood.<sup>283</sup> A secular, multiethnic, and multi-religious country cannot operate under Sharia law. The northern states have a significant percentage of Christians, and Sharia law does not apply to them.<sup>284</sup> Thus, the federal government needs to reform the justice system to cater to such sensitivities. Engaging in dialogues with the religious leaders to make them understand that government has no vested interest is a first step. Second, respect for other belief systems needs to be stressed to avoid the “us and them” syndrome affecting all other sectors of the economy.

Nigeria is also bedeviled with corrupt judges. Anti-graft commissions such as the economic and financial crime commission and the independent corrupt practices and other related offences commissions have not been very effective in bringing corrupt judges to justice. Effective justice sector reform must include the removal of corrupt judges. Essentially, with the improvement of the justice system, the root causes of

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<sup>282</sup> Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stephan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5.

<sup>283</sup> Ploch, *Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, 11.

<sup>284</sup> Ibid.

extremism will gradually be reduced and the U.S. security policy will have better outcomes.

### **3. Poverty Eradication Programs**

Poverty eradication has been at the forefront of Nigeria's development priorities. Despite enormous resources, many Nigerians are living in abject poverty. The Subsidy Re-investment and Empowerment Program, which replaced the National Poverty Eradication Program, has neither been effective nor reached the community that has urgent needs.<sup>285</sup> The Subsidy Re-investment and Empowerment Program aims to harness the resources that would have gone into fuel subsidies for socio-economic programs and infrastructural development to improve the living conditions of Nigerians.<sup>286</sup>

The major shortcoming of the program is that it focuses on showcasing a good political scorecard rather than on affecting the lives of the people that need the incentives. For instance, in the media National Poverty Eradication Program appears to be reaching out to the people, but in reality that is not the case. The government needs to set priorities on executing these programs; otherwise, more problems will be created. The process should be fair, transparent, and devoid of political, ethnic, or religious biases. An option is for the president to set up a special task force to address poverty across Nigeria based on statistics from the national bureau for statistics. The task forces should also include short, medium, and long-term goals.

### **4. Prioritizing U.S. Humanitarian Assistance**

U.S. humanitarian and civil assistance programs need to be prioritized to address the problems that will improve security. What the United States perceives as humanitarian needs may not have an immediate impact on the people. A poverty-stricken country would prefer more food-related humanitarian assistance than the provision of clothes or blankets; food items would have been better for the Muslims in Djibouti during

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<sup>285</sup> Audu Joel Samson, Haruna Paul Ogwu, and Attah Amana Philip, "Strategy for Reducing Unemployment in Nigeria: The Role of Informal Sector," *International Journal of Capacity Building in Education and Management* 2, no. 1 (2013): 37.

<sup>286</sup> SURE-P, "Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme," <http://sure-p.gov.ng/main/index.php/sure-p-programmes/others/programme-objectives>.

Ramadan than the used clothes distributed by AFRICOM. Additionally, excess articles given to schools and hospitals may not be the exact items the schools or hospitals require. This argument does not mean that the items are not needed in Nigeria, but the programs should be problem specific. For instance, the U.S. HIV program in Nigeria for civilians and military personnel is successful. It could be deduced that the program has developed the capacity of Nigerians to fight infectious diseases. The swiftness with which the Nigerian health officials applied the CDC recommendations against Ebola demonstrates its success.

Addressing endemic human security problems such as poverty and illiteracy should be a priority of the U.S. security programs. One option is to explore the best way for the U.S.-Nigeria Bi-national Commission to help in setting these priorities. Another option for the United States is to review the Millenium Challenge Corporation qualification criteria based on millennium challenges and not based on gross domestic product or World Bank classification of countries below the lower middle-income level. A third option is to consider reorganizing and streamlining humanitarian assistance to meet the aspirations of most African countries. If underlying causes of insecurity in Nigeria are addressed, it will be easier to identify the weakness or effectiveness of the U.S. security policy.

Notably, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which came into force in 2010, seek to address such challenges of U.S. diplomatic engagements as interagency coordination and administering aid.<sup>287</sup> Nonetheless, the first QDDR could not address interagency coordination problems because it was more like a wish list than a strategic plan.<sup>288</sup> It is expected that the 2014 QDDR not only will speak to the issues, but also will prioritize U.S. humanitarian assistance for better outcomes of U.S. security initiatives.

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<sup>287</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review," November 13, 2014, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153109.pdf>

<sup>288</sup> Gerald Hyman, "Lessons for the 2014 QDDR," CSIS, September 23, 2014, <http://csis.org/publication/lessons-2014-qddr>

## **D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

The 2012 U.S. strategy toward SSA encapsulates U.S. foreign policy objectives and guides U.S. engagements in the region. Nonetheless, when it comes down to national issues, the strategy becomes too broad. Further, if the United States does not have an established mechanism to engage with a particular country, administering security and humanitarian programs become a challenge. Nigeria is a mixed case because the United States and Nigeria have a long-standing economic, political, and security relationship. The United States has multiple security and humanitarian initiatives in Nigeria as the chapter revealed. For instance, Nigeria is among the countries receiving the largest amount of the HIV/AIDS assistance from the United States. Also, Nigeria has benefited from counterterrorism and maritime security initiatives.

The chapter found that tradeoffs between U.S. national interests and Nigeria's security problems have not been clearly determined. This problem will continue to play into the rhetoric versus reality narrative in U.S. foreign policy engagements. The bureaucracy in Washington has also played out in the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy in Nigeria. The Leahy law debate on where to draw the line so that Nigeria gets the much needed aid has been inconclusive. Further, the problem of interagency coordination among the multiple U.S. agencies also affects outcomes.

At the same time, Nigeria has not done well in maintaining an operationally ready-armed force in terms of personnel strength, capability, and equipment holdings. The personnel strength of 80,000 in the AFN is grossly inadequate when compared to the population of 174 million people. The number suggests that Nigeria cannot fully dominate the ungoverned spaces in the northeast against extremism, if she is to address other regional or global security obligations. A lack of a robust intelligence capability and an autonomous counterterrorism-coordinating agency also affects outcomes of U.S. security initiatives.

The best U.S. initiative matched with improved on-ground capability may not yield sustained outcomes if the symptoms and underlying causes are not addressed. The symptoms approach requires the establishment of a central coordinating agency,

upgrading intelligence and CT capability, establishing a multinational task force, and developing a comprehensive strategy. The underlying causes approach requires Nigeria to refocus its education sector reform, justice sector reform, and poverty eradication programs. Another option is for the United States to set new priorities in its humanitarian assistance programs.

## **V. THESIS CONCLUSION**

U.S.-Nigerian relations typify a sinusoidal wave with many highs and lows, promises and failures, opportunities and misadventures. Nigeria is among the countries receiving the largest amount of U.S. assistance. On face value, it might raise questions about the effectiveness of U.S. programs, but the reality is that PEPFAR takes the highest percentage of U.S. assistance to Nigeria. The PEPFAR and DOD HIV programs have been successful as the HIV prevalence rate has decreased at the national level and among the military. Additionally, Nigeria's swift action against Ebola and the subsequent containment of the disease is a positive outcome on the overall U.S. health initiative. Nevertheless, these programs must be broadened to balance education and poverty reduction programs.

Furthermore, it is imperative that U.S. security assistance be delivered in a timely fashion. Human rights provisions enshrined in the Leahy law are the greatest obstacles to U.S. security assistance to Nigeria. While human rights are important, delays in resolving such issues could have grave consequences as can be seen with the expansion of Boko Haram. Additionally, occasions where the United States has delivered aid regardless of the dubious status of the recipient country's security agencies, such as Colombia, send mixed signals to allies like Nigeria.

Weaknesses are not exclusively attributable to mismatched assistance or delayed delivery of resources. Poor implementation is also a factor. In particular, the incapacity of Nigeria's security agencies has been part of the reason why programs cannot achieve their desired outcomes. The reduction in the strength of the military by more than 40 percent between 1985 and 2003 is inexplicable. Further, most of the military's equipment is obsolete and unsuitable for counterinsurgency operations. Intelligence and CT capability also seem to be weak. Thus, low numerical strength coupled with a lack of appropriate weapons makes banishing Boko Haram and other security threats improbable in the near future.

In order to improve the outcomes of U.S. security programs, both the symptoms and root causes need to be addressed. For the symptoms, Nigeria needs to develop its CT and intelligence capability because, without intelligence, any CT efforts are most likely to be futile. Further, the establishment of an autonomous central coordinating body and comprehensive national counterinsurgency strategy will help harness the resources from various agencies for effective counterinsurgency operations.

Addressing the underlying causes entails educational reforms, poverty eradication, and justice sector reform. These reforms will help engage the youth, increase their awareness, and improve their living conditions, which can guard against brainwashing and radicalization. For instance, the integration of the Koranic schools with the formal education system in Kano has started to yield positive results. The federal government of Nigeria needs to adopt the Kano model across the schools in the north. Additionally, the poverty eradication program and the justice sector reform effort require a major overhaul.

To ensure a better return on its investment through effective outcomes, the United States must explore better ways of providing humanitarian assistance. It is important to consult with officials of partner countries to help prioritize what they really need. The U.S.-Nigeria Bi-National Commission could be used effectively for this purpose. Additionally, it is hoped that the 2014 QDDR would address most of the human security issues raised. Future research should focus on the effect of U.S. domestic politics on U.S.-Nigeria relations to help ascertain what Nigeria really means to the United States. There is an urgent need to smooth out this tumultuous, yet significant relationship.

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